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CONTROL, QUALITY, AND COST:





I thought I heard it all on the floor of the Senate about
what the [MCOs] ... were doing to American families,
how health care was being compromised .... But when a
doctor comes before me and says, "I had to call the
[MCO] ... for approval to admit a patient and they said,
'No, we won't go along with your suggestion, your medical
advice, send the patient home,' this one doctor. said, "I
finally asked the person on the other end of the line, 'Are
you a doctor?"'
* Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994)) (regulating
employer-provided: retirement, health plans, and other benefits by imposing
reporting, disclosure, fiduciary, and administrative requirements on employers).
". Managed Care Organizations," for the purposes of this Note, are entities,
such as health management organizations ("HMOs"), preferred provider
organizations ("PPOs"), or independent practice associations ("IPAs") that
integrate the financing and delivery of health care into a single organization by
applying cost-containment devices, financial incentives, and risk-shifting
techniques. See Daniel N. Burton & Michael S. Popok, Managed Care 101, 72
FLA. B.J. 26, 26 (1998); Peter D. Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, Form, Function,
and Managed Care Torts: Achieving Fairness and Equity in ERISA
Jurisprudence, 35 HOUS. L. REv. 985, 991 (1998). See also infra notes 50-60
and accompanying text (discussing managed care organizations in greater detail,
including the types of cost-containment devices, financial incentives, and risk-
shifting techniques).
*** Brooklyn Law School Class of 2000; B.A., University of Rochester,
1995. The author wishes to thank his mother for always providing him
unconditional love and support.
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He said, "No."
. . . "Are you a Nurse?"
He said, "No."
. .. "Do you have a college degree?"
The man said, "Well, no.,
.. "Well, what is your training?"
He said, "Well, I have a high school diploma, and I have
the insurance company manual that I'm reading from."1
INTRODUCTION
While the doctor from Senator Durbin's statement on the
Senate floor never mentioned whether his particular patient was
suffering from a horrendous disease or whether a delay in treatment
would impair his patient's chances for recovery, he did make an
arguably more poignant point-that the doctor is no longer
completely in control of the care he provides to his patient.' At
first, this loss of control may seem advantageous, creating a check
on an over-eager doctor who orders tests and operations at the first
sign of trouble.3 However, the picture portrayed by Senator
Durbin's story casts doubt upon whether taking complete control
away from doctors, at least when such control is placed in the
hands of "managed care organizations" ("MCOs"), is truly
advantageous. The Senator's statement suggests that giving MCOs
control over a patient's treatment compromises the health care
'144 CONG. REC. S9733 (daily ed. Sept. 1, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Durbin).
2 See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (discussing the decision-
making position that health plans have assumed with the advent of managed
care).
3 See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (discussing the moral-hazard
problem raised by the independent physician within the fee-for-service health
care system).
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system because mere high school graduates, not experienced
doctors, are often entrusted with the power to provide or deny
treatment. Thus, there is a greater likelihood that an MCO will
make erroneous decisions and deny necessary or life-saving
treatment to consumers of pre-purchased health care.
This distrust of the managed care dominated health care market
is a far cry from what was apparently the consensus view of MCOs
less than five years ago, when both houses of Congress resounding-
ly defeated President Clinton's efforts to create nationalized health
care that would provide universal coverage to America.4 Senator
Durbin's simple story of distrust of an MCO's ability to provide
reasonable patient care illustrates both the quickness with which
perceptions may change and the irony with which large scale,
polycentric social reform may inhere since no one has found a way
to predict the outcome of such reform with any certainty.5 In
particular, it is ironic that Americans voted to abandon comprehen-
sive, government regulated health care seemingly to avoid an
unattractive Canadian-styled system that subjects consumers to
4 See Robin Toner, New Majority's Agenda: Substantial Changes May Be
Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1994, at A26 (explaining that the push for
comprehensive health care guarantying universal coverage ended even before the
democrats lost their majorities in the 1994 elections, and implying that the new
majority view focuses on an incremental approach which has effectively defeated
any hope for a government-run health care system). See also Albert R. Hunt,
Health Care Is Issue of the Decade: Anger With System Fuels Pressure For
"Patients' Bill of Rights," WALL ST. J., June 25, 1998, at A9 (explaining that
the "waxing and waning" of the public's views on health care is illustrated by
the defeat President Clinton's universal health care plan of 1993-94 because it
was "too massive and too complex," while a "sizable margin of Americans [now]
favor tougher managed care regulation" even if such regulation would raise costs
and create a new bureaucracy); Steve Sternberg, Finding the Health System Unfit
Many Americans Fear the Care Won't Be There Study: Consumers Support
Legislative Fix, USA TODAY, Nov. 23, 1998, at ID (implying that the defeat of
the President Clinton's health care plan five years ago demonstrated that the
consensus view favored private, for-profit managed care).
' See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 353, 401 (1978) (concluding that polycentric social issues are not amenable
to judicial decision because such issues may lead to unworkable decisions with
unexpected repercussions).
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rationing. 6 Yet even with the chosen form of health care deliv-
ery-private, for-profit managed care-American consumers still
endure the effects of rationing.7
Compounding the fact that MCOs subject their consumers to
the detrimental effects of rationing, such as the delay or denial of
life-saving treatment,8 there is no vehicle through which consumers
may seek to redress any injuries incurred as a result of this
rationing by MCOs.9 This result violates any concept of fairness
rooted in law. In fact, it is a fundamental tenet of the law that
culpable conduct which causes injury to a consumer may be
redressed.' 0 This principle is the cornerstone of a consumer's trust
6 See Patrick J. Monahan, The Provinces, Ontario Caring for Medicare,
GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), July 15, 1998, at A15 (explaining that Canada's
health care system rations the supply of health care services to reduce total
spending, resulting in longer than clinically reasonable waits for routine surgical
procedures and compelling Canadians to endure more prolonged physical pain
and to be absent from work while awaiting treatment).
7 See infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text (discussing the different cost
containment mechanisms employed by the managed care system, with the net
effect of compelling consumers to consume less health care than they want or
need).
8 See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text (explaining that MCOs, by
employing cost-containment mechanisms, compel consumers to consume less
pre-purchased health care, producing similar detrimental effects as rationing, such
as the delay or denial of necessary or live-saving treatment).
9 See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text (explaining that ERISA fails
to provide substantive remedies and its preemption provisions preclude any
possible recovery through state law).
10 The principle that with every legal right violated there is a remedy at law
was articulated best by the Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (stating that "[tihe very essence of civil liberty certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury"). While this principle has been restricted since
the time of Marbury, it is more instructive within the context of the ERISA
health plan market in its descriptive sense rather than focusing on its prescriptive
value. As this principle demonstrates, a consumer often will have an expectation
before entering into a transaction that any injuries incurred will be redressed by
an orderly, efficient market. The Marbury principle, however, has been limited
by doctrine of the modem court, and has been expressly overruled in statutory
construction cases that require courts to provide only that relief which was
explicitly authorized by Congress within its statutory scheme. See infra notes
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in the marketplace. When the legal system fails to afford the
necessary remedies to maintain consumers' trust in the market,"
legislative reform may be required to restore that trust. Legislative
reform, as opposed to ad hoc court-imposed remedies, is preferred
especially where prior legislation is the source of the failure to
provide consumers with relief from marketplace injuries. 2 If such
legislation is left unreformed, its unworkable provisions will
continue to harm not only the trust of consumers, but also their
access to an essential good: "reasonable health care."'
13
169-170, 178-179, 187 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court cases
that expressly hold that in cases of statutory construction, courts may only
effectuate the remedial scheme desired by Congress and cannot base judgments
or awards on their own notions of good-policy).
"1 See infra .note 37 (discussing and providing examples of consumer distrust
of the health care market, stemming from the immediate constraints and
impediments created by MCOs).
"2 See supra note 10 (discussing consumers' expectation that their injuries
incurred as market participants will be redressed under the law) and infra notes
169-170, 178-179 (asserting that in cases where a statutory scheme fails to
provide a remedy, such as ERISA, courts cannot create a remedy). See also infra
notes 187-193 and accompanying text (explaining that only Congress has the
power to amend clearly expressed statutory rules, even when a statute has proven
to be unworkable, and detailing the policy reasons underlying this requirement).
13 For the purposes of this Note, the term "reasonable health care" is the
"effective delivery" of pre-purchased "health care coverage," as measured by a
"prudent lay-person" standard. See infra text accompanying notes 110-113
(describing the consumer protections provided by the Patients Bill of Rights Act
of 1998 which are encompassed in the notion of "reasonable health care"). See
also Patients Bill of Rights Act of 1998, H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. § 101(a)(2)(A)
(defining a "prudent lay-person" as someone "who possesses an average
knowledge of health and medicine").
The term "effective delivery" includes: (1) the receipt of adequate
information prior to enrollment concerning the extent of coverage, limitations on
coverage, and appeal processes for denials and delays of benefits, see id. § 121;
(2) the receipt of pre-purchased "medical care" when deemed medically
necessary according to a "prudent lay-person" standard for "emergency services,"
which are medical screening examinations within the capability of the emergency
department of a hospital or other auxiliary services, see id. § 101, or when
deemed necessary by a "reasonable doctor" for all other non-emergency services;
and (3) an undeniable right to access an internal and external (independent)
appeal process for denial or delay of any benefit within: (a) reasonable time for
any non-life threatening or non-permanent impairment where there is no risk of
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Specifically, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 ("ERISA")1 4 has failed to provide consumers with the ability
to seek relief when harmed by their MCO in the private sector
employer-provided health care market. 15 On March 31, 1998,
House Bill 3605, The Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 1998 ("the
Bill"),1 6 was introduced in order to cure the defects flowing from
ERISA's evisceration of a consumer's right under state law to
obtain redress from the negligent conduct of MCOs.1 7 The Bill
a lost opportunity to effectively treat and restore functions as if care was received
immediately; or (b) an expedited time period in accordance with the medical
exigencies. See id. §§ 131-33.
The term "health care coverage" includes items and services paid for
medical care or benefits consisting of medical care, which is provided directly,
through insurance or reimbursement, or otherwise under any hospital or medical
service policy or certificate, hospital or medical service plan contract, or health
maintenance organization contract offered by a health insurance issuer, and that
is subject to ERISA as part of an employer-provided service or benefit. ERISA
§ 733(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1191b(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
"Medical care" includes items and services paid for as medical care, such
as: (1) a diagnosis, cure mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease; (2) a
purpose affecting any structure or function of the body; (3) transportation
primarily for and essential to "medical care" as delineated in "(1)" and "(2)"
above; (4) insurance covering "medical care" as defined in "(1)," "(2)" and "(3)"
above. ERISA § 733(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1191b(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. H 1996).
14 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1994)).
15 See infra Part I.B.1, detailing how ERISA prevents consumers from
redressing their injuries caused by the negligence of their MCOs. See also
Corcoran v. United Healthcare, 965 F.2d 1321, 1333 (5th Cir. 1992) (asserting
that while the court is "not unmindful of the fact that [its] ... interpretation of
[ERISA] ... leaves a gap in remedies within the statute intended to protect
participants in employee benefit plans ... the lack of an ERISA remedy does not
affect... preemption analysis").
16 H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. (1998). The term "the Bill," as used in this Note,
refers both to the Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 1998 and to any similarly
crafted legislation that, at a minimum, adopts the essential provisions contained
in H.R. 3605. See infra text accompanying notes 110-113 (noting four key
consumer protections essential to effective federal legislative reform of the health
care system).
17 See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text (discussing the harm or
defects caused by MCOs, including: (1) distrust of the market; and (2) impaired
ability to obtain effective access to reasonable health care).
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was proffered in the hope of providing uniform consumer protectio-
ns.' 8 In order to restore the market position and confidence of
consumers in obtaining reasonable health care, most of the Bill's
protections borrowed provisions, in some form, from the "Consum-
er Bill of Rights and Responsibilities."' 9
In fact, the Bill was conceived and inspired by the work of the
members of a non-partisan commission.2 ° It provided, for the first
time, unified and consistent federal protections for all American
consumers of health care coverage, including consumers of
individual private plans.2' More importantly, however, the Bill,
18 See infra text accompanying notes 110-113 (discussing and enumerating
the key federal consumer protections first introduced in the "Consumer Bill of
Rights and Responsibilities").
'9 The "Consumer Bill of Rights and Responsibilities" was created as a
result of the work of a 34-member commission appointed by President Clinton
on March 26, 1997, to "recommend such measures as may be necessary to
promote and assure health care quality and value and protect consumers and
workers in the health care system." President's Advisory Commission Releases
Consumer Bill of Rights and Responsibilities (last modified Nov. 20, 1997)
<http://www.hcqualitycommission.gov/press/cbor.html#headl> [hereinafter
President's Advisory Commission].
On February 20, 1998, President Clinton released "an Executive Memoran-
dum directing all Federal health plans, which serve over 85 million Americans,
to come into substantial compliance with the President's Quality Commission's
Consumer Bill of Rights." The White House at Work, President Clinton: Patient
Bill of Rights (last modified Feb. 20, 1998) <http://www.hcqualitycommission.-
gov/press/pbor.html>.
20 The 34-member commission, consisting of a non-partisan group of experts
in the field of health care, including insurance companies, federal regulators,
medical care professionals and providers, recommended legislation to improve
the often criticized health care delivery system, to restore consumer trust in the
health care industry, and to educate consumers seeking redress for injuries caused
by their MCOs on the variety and limitations of services, and appeal processes
available from MCOs). President's Advisory Commission, supra note 19.
21 The White House, Remarks by the President on Health Care Quality: The
East Room (last modified March 13, 1998) <http://www.hcqualitycommission.-
gov/press/final.html> (noting that on March 13, 1998, President Clinton called
for Congress to extend the protections of the Patients' (Consumers) Bill of Rights
to all Americans that had been recently provided by executive order to the one-
third of the nation's population covered by federal health care plans). See H.R.
3605, 105th Cong. §§ 201(a)'(a)' and 202(a)'(a)' (1998) (providing that each
group health plan and health insurance issuer "shall comply with the patient
633
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while generally claiming not to modify section 514 of ERISA,22
actually amends section 514 and subtly carves out a narrow
exception 23 to the doctrine of preemption, as applied to private
sector employer-provided health care plans for over the past two
decades.24
The Bill adjusts the incentives of both MCOs 2' and consum-
ers26 within the context of private sector employer-provided health
protection requirements under title I of the Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 1998")
(amended material in original contained within single quotation marks).
22 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994). The relevant provision of the Bill that cautions
against construing title I as modifying section 514 of ERISA is H.R. 3605, 105th
Cong. § 192(a)(2).
23 H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. § 192(a)(1) (creating a statutory scheme
announcing, in general, that the Bill "shall not supersede any provision of state
law... except to the extent [it] prevents the application [of the standards of this
title]"). This general scheme is subject to section 514 of ERISA, which
effectively preempts state law remedies against health plans regulated thereunder.
See H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. § 192(a)(2). This scheme, however, allows narrow
exceptions to ERISA's preemption of state law negligence claims. See infra Part
II.B, discussing the statutory scheme of the Bill in greater detail.
24 Section 514 of ERISA has been held to preempt state law remedies that
relate to the quantity and administration of services provided by an employer
group health plan. Angela M. Easley, A Call to Congress to Amend ERISA
Preemption of HMO Medical Claims: The Dissatisfactory Distinction between
Quality and Quantity of Care, 20 CAMPBELL L. REv. 293, 299-300 (1998). See
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1987) (holding that a claim
based on the alleged improper processing of benefits, essentially an action
relating to the quantity of benefits provided, was preempted by section 514 of
ERISA).
2- See H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. § 302(a)(e)(1) (imposing immediate
culpability on MCOs providing health care through private-sector employers for
"any cause of action under state law to recover damages resulting from personal
injury and wrongful death"). This provision of the Bill provides a strong
incentive for MCOs to ensure that the administration of pre-purchased health care
to the consumer is efficient, timely, and appropriate because, if not, consumers
may seek redress through state law actions which could be costly to MCOs, both
in terms of time, damage awards against them, and ruined reputation or loss of
the good will of the public. See id.
26 See H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. §§ 121-23 (encouraging consumers to inform
themselves of the internal workings of the health care system, including:
appropriate amounts and limitations of coverage, relevant appeal procedures, and
available outside help).
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plans, so as to encourage the administration of reasonable, quality
care to a well-informed consumer. Under the Bill, a consumer may,
when necessary, hold liable only the party actually responsible for
the negligent conduct or defective delivery of pre-purchased health
care.27 As a result, the Bill effectively ensures that the consumers
retain their right of redress under state law in discrete and appropri-
ate situations,2" while concomitantly guarding against the estab-
lishment of a Federal statutory tort system.29 Further, the Bill has
only slightly lifted the preemption blanket provided under
ERISA,3 ° which protects employer-provided health plans from
direct liability,31 in order to allow consumers to recover under
available state law remedies protecting against essentially the same
conduct prohibited by the Bill.32 Thus, the Bill affords a unified
27 See H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. § 302(a)(e) (1998). See also infra note 108
(analyzing the provision of the Bill providing consumers the ability to hold
MCOs liable when their negligent conduct causes them injury, but explaining that
the Bill narrowly tailors this liability).
28 See H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. § 302(a) (amending ERISA and imposing
direct liability on any person, in connection with the provision of insurance,
administrative services, or medical services, including arrangements made to
recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death).
29 See id. (stating that the consumer can recover for damages directly caused
by the MCO under state but not federal law). While the actual recovery will be
under any state law that has analogous provisions to the Bill, the standards and
requirements imposing liability under the Bill are often the model for the
analogous state law provision. See infra notes 32 & 161 and accompanying text
(comparing the Bill's function as a procedure to the traditional Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins interpretation of the relationship between federal and state law).
30 See infra Part II.B, discussing the Bill's narrowly tailored statutory
scheme.
31 See Easley, supra note 24, at 305-09 (discussing that courts have held that
ERISA preempts direct liability claims against MCOs for corporate negligence
in the selection and retention of physicians, as well as for direct negligence
claims arising from cost containment systems).
32 See infra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing the liability
structure of the Bill). The Bill affords the procedure and model standards by
which to obtain relief, while the state law provides the substantive provisions
through which the Federal procedures are enforced. See Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938) (holding that Congress cannot declare
substantive rules of law applicable in a state, but leaving open the use of
procedural rules, such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-adopted soon
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and consistent Federal procedure for recovery under state law to
the extent that private sector employer-provided health plans
governed by ERISA are directly,33 but not vicariously or inciden-
tally,34 liable for failing to comply with the consumer protection
provisions of the Bill.3
This Note argues that because ERISA has effectively prevented
consumers from redressing their marketplace injuries through the
legal system,3 6 federal legislation is necessary to cure the defects
in the health care system flowing therefrom, such as consumers'
distrust in the health care market37 and their impaired ability to
obtain effective, reasonable care.38 In fact, Federal legislative
after the Court's decision was issued-to ensure that Congress could protect
Federal rights).
3 See Easley, supra note 24, at 309-12 (discussing the lack of direct liability
of MCOs).
14 See Easley, supra note 24, at 311-12 (noting that liability of MCOs under
ERISA is solely vicarious, creating incentives for inefficiency and harm to
consumers).
" See infra text accompanying notes 110-113 (discussing the key protections
provided by the Bill).
316 See infra notes 116-118 and accompanying text (cataloguing examples of
consumers impeded and injured by the negligence of their MCOs, but unable to
obtain redress). While some courts have allowed consumers relief, the ability to
seek redress has been prevented by ERISA preemption of state common law or
the traditional mechanism utilized for consumer protection within the market-
place. ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994); ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a) (1994).
37 Consumers' distrust in the health care market currently predominated by
MCOs stems from the immediate "constraints" and "impediments" that prevent
their access to timely, reasonable health care, such as the variety of people
authorized to handle requests, treatment coverage decisions, and appeals,
including: marketing or claims administrative staff; case workers; and medical
professionals. See Grievance Procedures for Health Care Quality, 1998: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 105th
Cong. (1998) [hereinafter Hearing on Grievance Procedures] (statement of
Bernice Steinhardt, Director of Health Services Quality & Public Health Issues
Group of the General Accounting Office). See also infra note 60 (discussing
consumers' distrust of the health care market in greater detail).
3 See ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994) (explaining that ERISA
remedies, if any, merely provide recovery of the value or cost of the wrongfully
denied benefit); Hearing on Grievance Procedures, supra note 37 (statement of
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reform, creating a procedural vehicle through which consumers
may obtain redress under state law substantive enforcement
provisions, is the only approach that will provide consistent,
uniform relief for consumers of private sector employer-provided
health care injured by the negligence of their MCOs.3 9
Part I of this Note provides a brief overview of the recent rise
in popularity of the MCO-structured health care system in contrast
with the previously predominant fee-for-service system of deliver-
ing health care. Part I also examines the adverse effect of ERISA
on the delivery of health care to consumers under the managed care
system. Part II explores the incentives ERISA creates for an MCO
to delay or deny coverage and to fail to adequately inform
consumers of the extent and limitations of their coverage and their
right to appeal those delays or denials.4 ° In particular, this Part
analyzes the Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 1998 and proposes that
Congress enact the Bill or similar legislation adopting provisions
that effectively allow consumers to obtain redress from MCOs.
4 1
Part II also argues that the key provisions of the Bill are crucial to
reverse the incentive of MCOs to provide less than adequate
coverage and to ensure the efficient delivery of health care. Finally,
Part III suggests that the Patients' Bill of Rights Act, or other
similar federal legislation, provides a superior method of reform to
Olena Berg, Asst. Secretary of the Dep't of Labor's Pension and Welfare
Benefits Admin.). See also infra note 60 (explaining that MCOs have impaired
consumers' access to care and, in effect, have rationed their pre-purchased health
care services). This unfortunate effect may only be cured by federal legislation
expressly exposing MCOs to liability for tort damages and requiring MCOs to
redress the injuries that result, as a practical matter, from their negligent
decision-making. See infra Part HI, discussing federal legislation as the best
method to amend ERISA's failure to provide consumers relief from the
negligence of their MCOs.
'9 See infra note 153 and accompanying text (analyzing the procedure
utilized by the Bill and explaining its effects on ERISA).
' See infra notes 116-121 and accompanying text (asserting that because
ERISA preempts direct liability against MCOs, it provided incentives for MCOs
to deny or delay coverage, proffer inaccurate information and provide bureaucrat-
ic impediments to reasonable care).
4" See infra text accompanying notes 110-113 (discussing and enumerating
the federal consumer protections first introduced in the "Consumer Bill of Rights
and Responsibilities").
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other methods advocated by commentators.42 This Note concludes
that enactment of the Bill would eliminate the current defects43 in
the private sector employer-provided health care market and would
begin to restore consumers' trust in the health care market by
promoting a more efficient health care system.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE MANAGED CARE SYSTEM AND ERISA
A. Managed Care versus the Fee-for-Service System
Traditionally, health care has been delivered through the fee-
for-service system.' In this system, insurers pay health care
providers or reimburse patients upon completion of all medical
treatment, and the decisions to perform a specific medical treatment
and to incur the corresponding expense lie entirely within the
providers' discretion.45 This traditional method for delivering
health care was purposefully structured "to avoid interference with
doctors' relationships with patients or with doctors' styles of
practice."46 However, the standard application of the fee-for-
service system creates a moral hazard for both the patient and the
physician, where neither has any incentive to avoid unnecessary
costs. 47 Often patients are fully covered for treatments that have
42 See infra note 166 and accompanying text (discussing other methods of
reform suggested by commentators).
41 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text (noting the defects in the
health care system created by ERISA).
4 See Suzanne M. Grosso, Rethinking Malpractice Liability and ERISA
Preemption in the Age of Managed Care, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 433, 434
(1998) (discussing the fee-for-service health care system).
45 See Grosso, supra note 44, at 434 (asserting that under a fee-for-service
system consumers were reimbursed or providers were paid upon completion of
treatment, implicitly assuring consumers that needed care would be paid for by
their insurer).
46 David D. Griner, Note, Paying the Piper: Third-Party Payor Liability for
Medical Decisions, 25 GA. L. REv. 861, 862 (1991).
47 See J. Patrick Green, Annual Survey of the United States Supreme Court
and Federal Law Essay: Speculations on Managed Care, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV.
679, 682 (1998); Grosso, supra note 44, at 434 (explaining that both providers
and patients had little reason to question the propriety of a particular treatment).
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only small incremental benefits, with doctors aware that they will
be paid for their services in any case.48 Patients then compound
the moral hazard through their inability to monitor the quality of
their medical care as well as their own lack of incentive to avoid
ineffective care.49
Escalating health care costs caused a shift in the predominant
form of health care delivery from fee-for-service to managed
care.50 Between 1970 and 1990, enrollment in the managed care
system increased from 3.6 million to 35 million Americans. 1 In
1997, approximately 125 million people, half of all Americans,
received their health care through a managed care organization
sponsored by a private sector employer plan.52 The vast majority
of these plans are subject to ERISA, which preempts state law
remedies against MCOs.5 3 Although the primary impetus for this
48 In the traditional fee-for-service system, a third party payor reimbursed
most services and treatment rendered to patients. This system provided incentive
for physicians to increase services to patients because any test or procedure was
not only a benefit for the patient, but also a profit for the physician. See Kenneth
R. Pedroza, Note, Cutting Fat or Cutting Corners, Health Care Delivery and its
Respondent Effect on Liability, 38 AIZ. L. REv. 399, 401 (1996). Thus, the fee-
for-service system of reimbursement increases the overall costs of health care
coverage because there is no incentive to constrain consumption of the patient
or spending by the doctor. Id.
49 See Green, supra note 47, at 683.
50 Alison Faber Walsh, Comment, The Attack on Cost Containment: The
Expansion Liability for Physicians and Managed Care Organizations, 31 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 207, 213-15 (1997) (noting that increased health care costs
forced insurers and employers to consider a new method of delivery and led to
a new era of managed care).
"' Deven C. McGraw, Note, Financial Incentives to Limit Services: Should
Physicians Be Required to Disclose These to Patients?, 83 GEO. L.J. 1821, 1823
(1995).
52 See Hearing on Grievance Procedures, supra note 37 (statement of Olena
Berg, Asst. Secretary of the Dep't of Labor's Pension and Welfare Benefits
Admin.). See also Robert Pear, H.M.O.'s Using Federal Law to Deflect
Malpractice Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1996, at 24 (noting that, in 1996, 120
million Americans were subject to ERISA preemption).
" See Hearing on Grievance Procedures, supra note 37 (statement of Olena
Berg, Asst. Secretary of the Dep't of Labor's Pension and Welfare Benefits
Admin.) (noting that in most states about 70 to 80% of the private sector health
market is subject to preemption of state law consumer protections).
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change54 in the way health care was delivered can be explained
as a compelled response by insurers, policymakers, and employers
to lower out of control health care costs, there is evidence that
quality was an important factor in the shift from fee-for-service to
managed care.
Notwithstanding this concern for quality, the cost containment
mechanisms employed by MCOs, such as utilization review,
56
' Unlike under the fee-for-service system of health care delivery that is
based on a contract between the consumer and insurance carrier, the managed
care method for delivering care depends on a contract between the health care
provider and the MCO. See Walsh, supra note 50, at 215.
" See Walsh, supra note 50, at 215 (asserting that although the primary
purpose of managed care plans is to lower medical costs, "managed care attempts
to provide quality health care in a cost efficient manner") (emphasis added).
From the beginning of the rise in popularity of managed care systems, cost
reduction, while the primary goal, was not the only factor underlying the purpose
of managed care. See Walsh, supra note 50, at 215 (stating that "[t]he United
States introduced the concept of managed care to control the delivery of quality
health care") (emphasis added). More specifically, when Congress introduced the
Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 300e to 300e-17
(1994), the purpose was to provide financial assistance and encourage the
development of managed care organizations so long as they met federal require-
ments. See Diana Joseph Bearden & Bryan J. Maedgen, Emerging Theories of
Liability in the Managed Health Care Industry, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 285, 291
(1995). Under the HMO Act, MCOs must ensure that quality health care is
provided and assume all responsibility for health care services delivered on a
prospective or pre-paid basis. See William J. Bahr, Comment, Although Offering
More Freedom to Choose, "Any Willing Provider" Legislation is the Wrong
Choice, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 557, 562 (1997).
56 See Walsh, supra note 50, at 216 (stating that "[u]tilization review is a
cost containment mechanism implemented by MCOs that attempts to lower
health care costs by reducing the number of unnecessary medical procedures,
hospital stays and tests" by hiring a board to review and screen each patient's
records to determine if the treatment or care recommended by the patient's
doctor is medically necessary). Utilization review can take three forms:
"prospective," "concurrent," or "retrospective." See Walsh, supra note 50, at 217.
When MCOs make "prospective" decisions-i.e., before any care is
administered-to delay or deny care, there is a potential that those decisions are
negligent or represent culpable conduct. See infra notes 116-118 and accompany-
ing text (providing examples of MCOs' negligent decision-making and failure to
afford reasonable care). This analysis equally applies to MCOs when they make
"concurrent" decisions-i.e, during the course of administering care.
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capitation,57 and payment incentives,58 actually tend to sacrifice
In contrast, when MCOs make "retrospective" decisions-i.e., after the care
has been administered-to delay or deny coverage of such care, which is similar
to fee-for-service approach, there is little opportunity for the MCO to cause
injury because the care has been administered and only thereafter has its
coverage been denied. Thus, under retrospective utilization review, even if the
MCO wrongfully denies payment or coverage after the care was administered,
the only damage will be pecuniary and is capable of recovery in an action for
breach of contract under ERISA's enforcement provisions. See Hearing on
Grievance Procedures, supra note 37 (statement of Olena Berg, Asst. Secretary
of the Dep't of Labor's Pension and Welfare Benefits Admin.). See also ERISA
§ 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994) (providing that "[a] civil action may be
brought ... to recover benefits due ... under the terms of ... [a] plan, to
enforce ... rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify... rights to future
benefits under the terms of the plan").
" Capitation is an alternative method of compensating physicians for their
services, where the physician is paid a flat rate for each patient enrolled in the
MCO regardless of the amount of care or services provided in a particular
month. See Walsh, supra note 50, at 217-18. Thus, the financial risk of caring
for patients is shifted to the primary care physician, because if a patient requires
more care than allotted for any given month the doctor will lose the value of
those services expended beyond the monthly budget. See Walsh, supra note 50,
at 218. Should the patient need less medical care than the MCO has paid for in
that month, the doctor will receive a windfall or greater value for the services
actually provided. See Walsh, supra note 50, at 218. This shift in financial risk
of caring for a patient creates an incentive for physicians to limit the direct
medical services provided to their patient.
While this perceived incentive for doctors to limit the amount of service or
care they provide their patients appears positive, it is often cited as the cause of
many consumers discontent with and distrust of the managed care system. See
supra note 37 (noting the sources of consumers' distrust of MCOs). This is
because the patient will never know whether care, in any given circumstance, is
unnecessary or merely not recommended because the doctor wishes to protect his
own pecuniary position, which ultimately increases the profits of MCOs. See
Walsh, supra note 50, at 218-19 (asserting that a physician has a vested financial
interest in the amount of medical care that exceeds the pre-set amount and
implying that this creates incentive for a physician to under-utilize treatments).
See also Bahr, supra note 55, at 566 (explaining that financial incentives for both
MCOs and providers-i.e., physicians-to reduce services in order to reduce
costs lead to "under-utilization" of health care).
58 Payment incentives are employed by MCOs to further reduce health care
costs by encouraging physicians to limit the amount of outside services, tests, or
specialists that they recommend to their patients. See Walsh, supra note 50, at
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quality in return for lower costs59 by constraining and impeding
219. MCOs may employ any of the following "payment incentives": (1)
"withhold risk pools," where a portion of the physician's monthly capitated
payment is withheld and placed in a pool that all outside services are paid from,
and if there is a surplus the physician will keep it as a bonus, while any deficit
will become a loss for the physician; (2) "bonuses," where rewards paid to
physicians who maintain the amount of outside services they recommend below
a preset level for the year; or (3) "expanded capitation," where the MCO
includes the amount allotted for outside services in the monthly flat fees paid to
the physicians for each patient, which is essentially the physician's own income
paying for the outside services recommended. See Walsh, supra note 50, at 219-
20.
Payment incentives that encourage limiting the amount of outside services
recommended are often utilized in conjunction with utilization review or
capitation. See Walsh, supra note 50, at 219. These create incentives to limit
internal physician services provided, as both forms of incentive to limit internal
or external health care expenditures ensure that overall health care costs decrease.
See Walsh, supra note 50, at 219. These cost containment mechanisms are used
together because when internal medical costs are reduced by employing only one
type of cost reduction mechanism, the other unconstrained or external medical
costs may increase overall costs. See Walsh, supra note 50, at 219.
'9 See Hearing on Grievance Procedures, supra note 37 (statement of Dr.
Thomas McAfee, Chief Medical Officer, Brown & Tolland Medical Group)
(stating that MCOs are committed to providing "high quality services" and that
consumers do not want increased regulation at the expense of higher premiums).
In fact, managed care was perceived as a way of reducing costs while retaining
most benefits of a fee-for-service system. See Grosso, supra note 44, at 450-51.
It was assumed that private managed care businesses, through their ability to
operate efficiently in the free-market, could cut-the-fat while retaining quality
services. See Walsh, supra note 50, at 215. Indeed, the lower costs were
characterized as savings to the consumer and not as increased profits for the
MCOs. Political lobbyists assumed and then convinced the public that the private
sector could generate enough revenue to provide good medical service even
though it spent less on such service. See Jack W. Germond & Jules Witcover,
Defeat of Tobacco Bill May Have Political Upside for Democrats, BALTIMORE
SuN, June 22, 1998, at All (implying that the fact that political strategists
convinced the public that President Clinton's effort to provide universal health
care coverage would create a new federal bureaucracy reveals that the public
believed managed care, even though it reduced costs, would provide quality
care). Even if this was true, the mere fact that the conduct of MCOs has reduced
the costs of health care and made it more affordable for consumers does not
excuse that same conduct if it happens to be negligent and cause injuries. By
allowing MCOs to remain free of tort liability because the framers of ERISA
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consumers access to care.60 More specifically, these cost contain-
ment mechanisms are often employed by MCOs as a means to
control the decision-making of physicians by either directly
created federal legislation preempting all state law remedies, it is tantamount to
Congress advocating the sacrifice of consumers lives and safety for the mere
advantage of lower cost health care.
0 In fact, it appears that the managed care system, within the context of the
private sector employer-provided health care market, has rationed consumers'
pre-purchased services without the fear of liability for negligent, culpable
conduct. See infra note 155 (analyzing basic economic principles of free markets
and concluding that MCOs have artificially reduced the supply of health care by
denying consumers their pre-purchased services). This leaves open the question
of whether MCOs are using the cost savings to enhance their own profits or
whether ERISA merely has made liability-free MCOs complacent because they
can still earn a profit by denying pre-purchased services. It is possible that
MCOs planned to be innovative market providers by creating and exploiting new
areas for profit through marketing or investment in other opportunities, so as to
reduce costs and still provide reasonable health care coverage. But, it is more
likely that a lack of liability under ERISA has left MCOs content to merely
ration the pre-purchased services to consumers, often to the consumers'
detriment. See infra notes 117-118 (detailing specific instances where MCOs'
decisions have delayed or denied health care coverage and, as a result, injured
or caused the death of a patient).
Consequently, consumers have become distrustful of the health care market
and have little confidence in their MCOs. A national survey in 1998 by the
Kaiser Family Foundation and Harvard University found that 55% of respondents
said that they were worried that if they were sick their health plan would be
more concerned with costs than about their care. Carol Marie Cropper, In Texas,
a Laboratory Test on the Effects of Suing H.M.O. 's, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1998,
at Cl. Often the persons making treatment decisions have insufficient informa-
tion, expertise or information to properly refer consumers to the appropriate
provider or to proffer accurate coverage information. 60 Minutes: "Managed or
Mangled Care" (CBS television broadcast, Sept. 6, 1998). Moreover, consumers
are finding it very difficult to understand managed care given that MCOs often
offer only very technical information materials or provide conflicting information
on coverage, complaints, or appeal processes. See Hearing on Grievance
Procedures, supra note 37 (statement of Bernice Steinhardt, Director of Health
Services Quality & Public Health Issues Group of the General Accounting
Office). In fact, 56% of consumers either did not know they were in managed
care or did not know what that meant. See Hearing on Grievance Procedures,
supra note 37 (statement of Bernice Steinhardt). Indeed, these problems are a
large part of the concern that many policymakers have expressed with the
apparent control that MCOs exercise over a patient's treatment decisions.
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denying a doctor's recommended treatment or by discouraging
doctors from providing certain beneficial treatments in an effort to
reduce CoStS.6' By utilizing these cost containment mechanisms,
MCOs are in fact controlling treatment decisions.62 When MCOs
are negligent in making such decisions, by choosing to deny or
delay coverage for appropriate treatment, they harmfully constrain
consumers' access to reasonable care.
B. ERISA Preemption
The predominance of MCOs in the health care market reveals
the tremendous effect that their conduct has on a vast number of
American consumers.63 The expansive reach of an MCO's actions
demonstrates the importance of allowing consumers to hold MCOs
liable when their decisions preclude consumers from obtaining their
pre-purchased health coverage and, as a result, injure those
consumers by either denying or delaying their access to reasonable
care. Unfortunately, however, consumers of employer-provided
health care cannot seek redress for their injuries caused by the
negligence of their MCOs because federal law, which regulates
employer-provided health care, has failed to provide remedies for
direct negligence and has expressly preempted any possible state
law remedies.6
61 See Green, supra note 47, at 683 (asserting that "[in essence, the
managed care provider becomes a final decision-maker"). See also infra notes
116-118 (noting that when MCOs make decisions to deny or delay care there is
a potential that those decisions are negligent or represent culpable conduct,
because if the care that was denied was actually medically necessary and part of
the patient's pre-purchased health plan coverage, the patient could sustain injuries
as a result of the MCOs negligent decision).
62 See Green, supra note 47, at 683 (discussing the relationship between
MCOs and providers and noting that MCOs are the final decision-maker with
respect to treatment decisions for patient-consumers).
63 See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text (noting that enrollment in
the managed care system exploded between 1970 and 1990 to include 125
million Americans enrolled in a managed care plan subject to ERISA as of
1997).
64 See ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1994); ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a) (1994). Indeed, where Congress acts pursuant to its plenary powers,
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In 1974, ERISA was enacted by Congress pursuant to its
commerce and taxing powers, 65 in part, to regulate employer-
provided health care plans.66 It was drafted with an express
preemption provision barring state regulation "relate[d] to"
employer-provided health plans. 67 However, ERISA was primarily
enacted to establish standards of conduct for, and to impose
reporting and disclosure requirements on, fiduciaries of employer
pension plans to protect the financial interests of the employee plan
participants. 68 By enacting ERISA, Congress intended to replace
it may specifically prohibit parallel state legislation by employing an express
preemption provision. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 12.1, at 62-63 (2d ed.
1992). In fact, when Congress may regulate an area of private sector activity, it
may explicitly preempt and bar state regulation of that activity. Id. § 12.3, at 75.
65 Section 2 of ERISA provides in pertinent part:
Congress finds that the growth in size, scope and numbers of employee
benefit plans ... has been rapid and substantial; that the operational
scope and economic impact of such plans is increasingly interstate;...
that they are affected with a national public interest; ... that they have
become an important factor in commerce because of the interstate
character of their activities[;] .. . that a large volume of the activities
of such plans are carried on by means of the mails and instrumentali-
ties of interstate commerce; ... [and] that they substantially affect the
revenues of the United States because they are afforded preferential
Federal tax treatment ....
29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1994).
66 See ERISA § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (1994) (defining employee benefit plans
regulated by ERISA to include, "any plan, fund, or program ... established or
maintained by an employer ... to the extent [they are] ... maintained for
providing ... their beneficiaries ... medical, surgical, or hospital care or
benefits").
67 ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
61 See Barry B. Cepelewicz et al., Recent Developments in Medicine and
Law, 33 TORT & INS. L.J. 583, 583 (1998). The purpose of ERISA was to
remove many of the barriers facing employees in trying to recover benefits from
insufficiently funded pension plans by requiring disclosure and reporting of
financial and other information and by providing remedies, sanctions, and ready
access to the federal courts. See ERISA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) & (b) (1994).
See also Larry J. Pittman, ERISA's Preemption Clause and the Health Care
Industry: An Abdication of Judicial Law-Creating Authority, 46 FLA. L. REV.
355, 359 (1994) (citing 120 CONG. REc. 29,935 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits)
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a patchwork scheme of state regulation of pension plans with a
uniform set of federal regulations and protections.69 Seemingly,
ERISA was made applicable to employer-provided health plans
merely as an afterthought because, in contrast to its treatment of
pension plans, it does not mandate minimum levels of benefits nor
require that employees receive any such welfare plan.7 ° Although
ERISA's enforcement provisions provide judicial remedies to seek
(stating that "at the time of enactment, ERISA, was heralded as nothing less than
a pension plan bill of rights to which every worker ... is entitled") (emphasis
added)).
It is ironic that the very statute that vigilantly protects the rights of
employees within the context of pension plans by affording remedies for injuries
incurred as a result of their employers' or plan managers' negligence, has been
interpreted to ignore the very same employees when their health care plan or
managed care organization, through negligent decision-making, causes them
injuries. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987)
(holding that state law claim asserting negligent claim processing of benefits is
preempted); Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, 57 F.3d 350, 360-61 (3d Cir. 1995)
(holding that employee's direct liability claim of negligence against his health
benefit plan was preempted by ERISA); Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d
129, 131-32 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that ERISA preempted a state law claim for
wrongful death because the claim asserted that a health plan was negligent in
administering benefits).
69 See Pilot Life Ins., 481 U.S. at 46 (finding that the "'sole power to
regulate the field of employee benefit plans [was] ERISA's crowning achieve-
ment [and] . . . [i]t should be stressed that ... enforcement provisions . . . are
intended to preempt the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat
of conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit
plans"' (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 29,197, 29,933 (1974) (statements of Rep. Dent
and Sen. Williams)). Congress intended to:
ensure that plans ... would be subject to a uniform body of benefits
law; the goal was to minimize the administrative and financial burden
of complying with conflicting directives among [s]tates . . . [to
prevent] the potential conflict in substantive law ... requiring the
tailoring of plans ... to the peculiarities of the law of each jurisdic-
tion.
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990).
70 See Grosso, supra note 44, at 441 (explaining that ERISA does not govern
the substantive content of employee benefit plans and that the Department of
Labor has not promulgated any meaningful regulations pertaining to the
substance of employee benefit plans and has focused instead on pension plans).
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relief for breaches of contractual or fiduciary obligations, 7' the
statute has been interpreted as failing to provide a mechanism by
which employee-consumers can seek redress for injuries caused by
the direct negligence of their MCOs.
72
1. The Mechanics of ERISA's Dual Preemption Clauses
The problem for consumers of employer-provided health care
seeking relief for injuries caused by the direct negligence of their
MCOs, is that ERISA essentially eliminates any opportunity for
such relief, both because it fails to provide substantive remedies
and because it creates a statutory scheme with dual preemption
clauses that preclude recovery through state law remedies.73
7' ERISA § 502(a) provides in pertinent part:
A civil action may be brought-
(1) by a participant or beneficiary-
(B) to recover benefits due[,] ... to enforce rights
under the terms of the [health] plan, or to clarify rights
to future benefits ....
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin
any act or practice which violates ... the terms of the
[health] plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable
relief ....
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), (3)(A)-(B) (1994).
72 See infra note 73 and accompanying text. But see Corporate Health Ins.
v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d 597, 617-19 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (holding
that a direct negligence claim against an MCO with respect to the quality of
benefits actually provided, as opposed to a claim based on the denial of benefits,
may be brought under state law and escape ERISA preemption).
7' ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), (3) (also known as "complete
preemption"); ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) & (b)(2)(A)-(B) (1994) (also
known as "federal preemption").
Courts may utilize preemption, even in the absence of statutory authority,
to displace a claim under state law by applying the preemption doctrine
underlying the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
However, the type of preemption that would displace a claim under state law is
not a direct application of the Supremacy Clause because the intent of Congress
is not sufficiently clear to show a direct conflict with a state law. Nevertheless,
federal law overrides those state laws not directly conflicting when those state
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ERISA's preemption clauses displace state law claims in two ways.
First, a state law claim may be "completely preempted" if a federal
court determines that such a claim can be characterized as request-
ing recovery for benefits due, enforcement of contractual rights, or
clarification of rights to future benefits.74 If the court determines
laws "impair federal superintendence of the field." ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra
note 64, § 12.4, at 75-76.
Therefore, when legislators included health plans under the regime of
ERISA without explicit remedies, the powerful preemption clauses, intended
merely to maintain regulatory consistency and to encourage the formation of
employee benefit plans, effectively obliterated the ability for employee-
consumers of health care to seek redress for injuries caused by the direct negli-
gence of their MCOs. See Corcoran v. United Healthcare, 965 F.2d 1321, 1333
(5th Cir. 1992) (asserting that while the court is "not unmindful of the fact that
[its] ... interpretation of [ERISA] ... leaves a gap in remedies within the
statute intended to protect participants in employee benefit plans... the lack of
an ERISA Remedy does not affect ... preemption analysis"). In fact, the
Supreme Court has stated that ERISA's express preemption clauses:
Set forth a comprehensive civil enforcement scheme that represents a
careful balancing of the need for prompt and fair claims settlement
procedures against the public interest in encouraging the formation of
employee benefit plans. The policy choices reflected in the inclusion
of certain and the exclusion of others under the federal scheme would
be completely undermined if ERISA plan participants ... were free to
obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in ERISA.
Pilot Life Ins., 481 U.S. at 54 (emphasis added).
74 ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (stating that "[a] civil action
may be brought-by a participant or beneficiary . . . to recover benefits due to
him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan,
or to clarify his rights to future benefits under terms of the plan"). See also
Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, 57 F.3d 350, 353-54 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting the
Supreme Court's recognition that "complete preemption" is an exception to the
well-pleaded complaint rule, which ordinarily does not allow removal to federal
court merely because a defense of preemption may be established, since removal
is proper only if a federal question is presented on the face of plaintiff's
complaint. Thus, "complete preemption," as an exception to that rule, is justified
by the Court as a mere effectuation of Congress' intent to so completely preempt
a particular area that any civil complaint is "'necessarily federal in character')
(quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987) (emphasis
added)).
Within the context of ERISA, the Supreme Court has recognized that
Congress intended the "complete preemption" doctrine to apply to any state law
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that a plaintiff's state law claim is completely preempted, the claim
is insulated from state law analysis and decided by the court solely
under ERISA's provisions.75 Consequently, when state law claims
are determined to be completely preempted and a plaintiff's action
is decided exclusively under ERISA, MCOs are effectively shielded
from any liability for their negligent administration of health
care.
76
Second, even if a state law claim survives the court's complete
preemption analysis, it may still be preempted under ERISA's
"federal preemption" clause.77 However, the claim, as a general
matter, must first be heard in a state court to determine whether the
claim is subject to federal preemption.78 To make such a decision,
causes of action that attempt to regulate conduct in appreciably the same manner
as the ERISA enforcement provisions found in 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). See Taylor,
481 U.S. at 66.
71 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) (providing the basis for the "well-pleaded
complaint" rule, which requires that federal courts determine whether a plaintiff's
complaint has established that the case arises under federal law-essentially the
same inquiry necessary to determine whether a claim is "completely preempted").
Therefore, if a plaintiffs complaint establishes that a cause of action "arises
under" ERISA, a federal court must decide the case solely under ERISA. See id.
See also Grosso, supra note 44, at 442 (applying the well-pleaded complaint rule
to ERISA cases).
76 See Grosso, supra note 44, at 442.
7 ERISA § 514 (a) & (b) providing that the provisions of ERISA shall:
Supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan[,] ... nothing ... shall be
construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State
which regulates insurance, banking, or securities[, and] ... an
employee benefit plan . . . shall [not] be deemed to be an insurance
company or other insurer, bank, trust, or investment company or to be
engaged in the business of insurance or banking ....
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)-(b) (emphasis added).
78 See Taylor, 481 U.S. at 64 (finding that a prerequisite for the removal of
a plaintiffs state law claim to federal court under the "complete preemption"
doctrine is that the claim falls within the scope of an ERISA enforcement
provision, irrespective of whether the claim may be preempted by ERISA's
preemption clauses in 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)). See also Federal Tax Board v.
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983) (finding that if
complete preemption is not applicable, a federal court is without removal
jurisdiction and can only remand the claim to state court for a resolution of the
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the state court must make a three-step inquiry.79 First, if the state
law underlying the claim "relate[s] to" an employee benefit plan,
the court should hold that the claim is preempted.8 ° Second, if the
state law on which the claim rests does not regulate insurance,
banking, or securities, the claim will not be protected by the
"savings" clause8' and is preempted. Finally, if a state law
claim alleges that it is based on the regulation of insurance so as
to be shielded from preemption by the savings clause, the claim
will nonetheless be preempted under the "deemer" clause 83 when
the claim's alleged regulation of insurance rests on the
characterization of an employee benefit plan as an insurance
preemption issue).
" Grosso, supra note 44, at 444. See also Margaret G. Farrell et al., Health
Care Consumer Claims and Litigation, SCO4 ALI-ABA 271, 302 (1998)
[hereinafter Farrell, Consumer Claims] (explaining that ERISA's "federal
preemption" clause preempts state laws that "relate to" an ERISA plan, then
saving from preemption state laws that regulate insurance, and providing that
state insurance laws may not regulate ERISA plans that are self-insured,
sometimes called "fully-funded" plans).
'o ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (also known as the "relate to"
clause) (stating that "the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this
chapter shall supersede any and all laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan") (emphasis added). See infra Part I.B.,
discussing judicial interpretation of the "relates to" phrase.
8' ERISA § 514(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (stating that "[e]xcept as
provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to
exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates
insurance, banking, or securities") (emphasis added).
82 Compare ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (preempting all state law
claims which "relate to" an ERISA benefit plan), with ERISA § 514(b), 29
U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (saving only those state law claims relating to a benefit
plan which regulate insurance, banking, or securities).
83 ERISA § 514(b), also known as the "deemer" clause, provides in pertinent
part that:
Neither an employee benefit plan[,] ... nor any trust established under
such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other
insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be engaged
in the business of insurance or banking for the purposes of any law of
any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance
contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies ....
29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
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company.8' Therefore, the deemer clause instructs that a state law
claim cannot be protected by the savings clause merely because the
claimant's employee benefit plan provides insurance.
2. The Traditional Broad Interpretation of ERISA Preemption
For over two decades, the Supreme Court of the United States
has interpreted ERISA's dual preemption clauses broadly.86 In
particular, the Court has provided a broad interpretation of the
ERISA's "federal preemption" clause. For example, in Pilot Life
Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, the Supreme Court, relying on two of
its prior cases, stressed that ERISA's federal preemption clause has
an expansive sweep and that the phrase "relate to" contained within
that clause was intended to have its "broad common-sense
meaning,87 such that a state law 'relate[s] to' a benefit plan ...
'if it has a connection with or reference to such plan."' 88
84 See ERISA § 514(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
85 See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45 (1987) (finding that
the "deemer" clause makes clear that an employee benefit plan cannot be
"deemed" an insurance company for the purposes of asserting that a claim is not
preempted because the state law on which the claim rests purports to regulate
insurance). See also Farrell, Consumer Claims, supra note 79, at 302 (noting that
the "deemer" clause provides that state insurance laws may not regulate ERISA
plans that are self-insured, sometimes called "fully-funded" plans).
86 See Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 (1987) (recognizing
that Congress intended the "complete preemption" clause to displace any state
law causes of action that attempt to regulate conduct in appreciably the same
manner as the ERISA enforcement provisions codified in 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)).
87 481 U.S. at 47-48 (noting that the Court has interpreted the phrase "relate
to" within the federal preemption clause broadly so that state laws have been
preempted or displaced by ERISA when they have had a connection with or have
made reference to an ERISA benefit plan). See supra note 72 and accompanying
text (explaining that the interpretation of ERISA preemption by the federal
courts, with the exception of the recent interpretation of a federal court from
Texas, has effectively prevented consumers from bringing any direct negligence
claims against MCOs).
88 Pilot Life Ins., 481 U.S. at 47 (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85,
97 (1983)). See also Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138-39
(1990) (finding that Congress intended the "relate to" phrase to have a broad
meaning to the extent that "a state law may relate to a benefit plan, and thereby
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The Supreme Court has also interpreted ERISA's "complete
preemption" clause broadly. Specifically, the Supreme Court and
the lower federal courts have found that the detailed scheme of
enforcement provisions contained in section 502(a) of ERISA-i.e.,
the "complete preemption" clause-reflects the policy choices of
Congress to include and exclude certain remedies. 89 The Pilot Life
Court noted that such a deliberate balancing of policies embodied
in Congress' choice of remedies demonstrates that Congress
intended that no other remedies undermine its clearly defined
scheme. 90
Indeed, the Supreme Court has found that ERISA's broad
preemption provisions both proscribe interference with the benefit
plans formed under ERISA and integrate a civil enforcement
scheme, which is essential for accomplishing the stated purposes of
ERISA. 91 In determining whether a state law is preempted or
displaced, the Court has instructed that the inquiry begin with
congressional intent, where the purpose of Congress is the ultimate
touchstone. 92 In applying this mandate, the Supreme Court has
found that the underlying congressional intent of ERISA was to
"eliminat[e] the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local
regulation" for the purpose of encouraging the formation of
employee benefit plans. 93 More specifically, the Pilot Life Court,
be preempted, even if the law is not specifically designed to affect such plans,
or the effect is only indirect").
'9 See ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994) (providing that "[a] civil
action may be brought ... to recover benefits due[,] ... to enforce... rights[,]
• . .or to clarify ... rights to future benefits"); Ingersoll-Rand Co., 498 U.S. at
144-45 (explaining that exclusive remedies provided by section 502(a) of ERISA
demonstrates that the preemptive effect of ERISA is complete); Corcoran v.
United Healthcare, 965 F.2d 1321, 1333 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that Congress
may preempt state law causes of action that interfere with ERISA even if this
preemption may leave a gap in remedies within a statute intended to protect
ERISA plan participants).
90 Pilot Life Ins., 481 U.S. at 54.
91 Ingersoll-Rand Co., 498 U.S. at 137 (citing Pilot Life Ins., 481 U.S. at 52,
54).
92 Id. at 137-38 (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208
(1985)); Pilot Life Ins., 481 U.S. at 45.
9' Pilot Life Ins., 481 U.S. at 46 (citing 120 CONG. REC. 29,933 (1974)
(statement of Sen. Williams)).
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employing ERISA's dual preemption clauses, held that a state
cause of action based on an alleged improper failure to provide
benefits under the ERISA plan was undoubtedly preempted.94
3. The Judicial Narrowing of ERISA Preemption
The Supreme Court's established interpretation of ERISA's
preemption provisions, statutory scheme, and legislative history was
recently narrowed in New York State Conference of Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.95 In Travelers, the
reach of the Court's broad understanding of the "relate to"
clause 96 under the doctrine of ERISA preemption was limited to
state law claims that affect the structure, administration, and type
of benefits provided by a plan.97 Even more recently, the Supreme
94 Id. at 45-48, 54-57. The Pilot Life Court found that the effect of the
preemption clauses is not limited simply to state laws actually "designed to affect
employee benefit plans." Id. at 47-48. See also Ingersoll-Rand Co., 498 U.S. at
139 (explaining that preemption is not precluded simply because a state law is
consistent with ERISA's substantive requirements).
9- 514 U.S. 645, 658-60 (1995).
96 ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
97 See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658-60 (adopting a narrower interpretation of
the "relates to" ERISA preemption clause by applying a test, whereby a state law
would not be preempted when the relationship between that law and the
employee health plan was indirect and did not affect the structure, the
administration, or the type of benefits provided by the plan). See also Margaret
G. Farrell, ERISA Preemption and Regulation of Managed Health Care: The
Case for Managed Federalism, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 251, 261 (noting that
Travelers narrowed the traditionally broad interpretation of the "relate[s] to"
phrase). In addition, the Court in Travelers asserted in dicta that there is usually
a presumption against preemption of areas of traditional state regulation, such as
health and safety. 514 U.S. at 655. However, the Court made clear that ERISA
will continue to preempt any state law regulation that binds the health plan or
MCO to particular administrative requirements, yet preemption will be less likely
where the state regulation has only an "indirect economic influence." Id. at 668
(holding that "a state law might produce such acute, albeit indirect economic
effects ... as to force an ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of substantive
coverage or effectively restrict its choice of insurers[,j" which would be
preempted, but if the law does not fall into either that narrow category of laws
that indirectly effect yet substantially constrain ERISA, or have a direct
economic effect, the state law claim should not be preempted).
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Court confirmed this clarification of the "relate to" clause in De
Buono v. NYSA-ILA Medical & Clinical Services Fund.98 The De
Buono Court reiterated that the literal text of the "relate to" clause
is "clearly expansive[, b]ut. . . the text could not be read to extend
to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy."99 Ostensibly, the
Court has left intact the traditional understanding of ERISA
preemption,'00 while concomitantly recognizing a limitation on
preemption where there is "so tenuous a relation [to an ERISA plan
and the] . .. state law [is] in an area of traditional state regula-
tion.'" 01 In particular, the Court acknowledged that the preemp-
tion clause clearly supersedes state laws where, for example,
employers are required to provide certain benefits'0° or the
existence of an ERISA plan is a critical element of the state law
cause of action.10 3
However, recently the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
in contravention to the Supreme Court's established interpretation
of ERISA preemption, narrowed the "complete preemption" clause.
98 520 U.S. 806, 813-16 (1997).
99 Id. at 813-14 (quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655).
'0o Id. (explaining that in "earlier ERISA preemption cases, it had not been
necessary to [interpret the outer edges or define the exact reach of preemption]
... in order to find preemption because the state laws at issue . .. had a clear
'connection with' or 'reference to' ERISA benefit plans") (quoting Shaw v. Delta
Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983)).
"' Id. at 814 n.9 (quoting California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement
v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 519 U.S. 316, 333-34 (1997)). The Court held that
a state law imposing a tax on hospitals owned by ERISA plans is not preempted
because it is a law of general applicability imposing minimal burdens on the
administration of the ERISA plans, and hence does not "relate to" the ERISA
plans. Id. at 814-16.
102 Id. at 814-16 (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97 (holding that ERISA
preempted a state law requiring the provision of pregnancy benefits); Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985) (holding that a state law
requiring benefit plans to include minimum mental health benefits "relate[d] to"
ERISA and was preempted)).
103 Id. (citing Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, at 139-40
(1990) (holding that because a particular state law was not a generally applicable
statute and was dependent on the existence of an ERISA plan in establishing
liability under its provisions, the state law "relate[d] to" ERISA and was
preempted)).
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In Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare,'O° the Third Circuit held that where
a state law claim rests on the quality of treatment provided, and not
on the quantity and administration of services or the decision by
the MCO to deny coverage, the claim should not be preempt-
ed.' O5 While this judicial narrowing of ERISA's dual preemption
104 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995).
105 Id. at 358-59 & n.5, 360-61. The Third Circuit essentially relied on
district court opinions that attempted to distinguish the nature and type of claims
underlying the cases in which the Supreme Court decided the correct statutory
construction of the ERISA preemption clauses, to avoid the Supreme Court's
broad application of ERISA preemption of state law claims. See Dukes, 57 F.3d
at 360 (citing Kearney v. U.S. Healthcare, 859 F. Supp. 182, 186-87 (E.D. Pa.
1994) (holding that ERISA preempts a direct negligence claim, but not a
vicarious liability claim); Independence HMO v. Smith, 733 F. Supp. 983, 987-
89 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (noting that ERISA does not preempt vicarious liability
claims)). Dicta from the Supreme Court's opinion in Travelers appeared to
modify the Court's historic position on the statutory construction of ERISA and
the proper interpretation of the statute's legislative history. See 514 U.S. 645,
656-57, 659-61, 668 (1995). However, there is no support for the Third Circuit's
decision to artificially narrow the reach of ERISA's preemption clauses by
adopting a construction of ERISA that greatly departs from the traditionally
accepted interpretation of Congress' intent in enacting ERISA with express and
severe preemption clauses.
Relying primarily on lower court cases, the Dukes Court also expanded the
Supreme Court's decision in Travelers by taking the narrow limitation the
Supreme Court tried to carve out in the "relate to" preemption clause, ERISA
§ 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), and applying it to the "complete preemption"
clause, ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 355, 361
(concluding that preemption of a state law claim was improper when based on
the mere "quality" of benefits received because when "there [are] no allegation[s]
... that the HMOs [either] denied anyone any benefits [or, in the rare case,
breached any quality standards rising to the level of a denial of benefits] which
were due under the plan" a state law claim should not be preempted). In essence,
the Third Circuit expanded one of the Supreme Court's mere examples of state
action-the setting of "quality standards"-which would affect cost, but would,
in most circumstances, have only an indirect economic impact on a plan and
preclude preemption of a claim rooted in such state action. See Travelers, 514
U.S. at 660-61. The Third Circuit in expanding the narrowly carved out
exception to the "relate[s] to" preemption, noted that when "[n]othing in the
record suggests ... [displacement] of otherwise applicable state laws of agency
and tort ... [iut would seem that ... a plan ... [which adopted] its own
[quality] standard of acceptable health care.., should [have to] provide.., an
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clauses is a welcomed trend for consumers who have been denied
effective redress for injuries incurred from the negligence of their
MCOs, federal legislation is still necessary to permanently and
effectively amend ERISA preemption.1 16 To implement consistent
and effective health care reform, Congress must enact legislation
that will protect Americans and free consumers in private sector
employer-provided health plans from the impediments to relief
contained in ERISA so as to promote the effective delivery of
reasonable health care.
II. PATIENT'S BILL OF RIGHTS ACT OF 1998
A. Key Provisions
The best approach to cure the defects in the health care market,
such as consumers' distrust and their inability to obtain relief for
the injuries caused by the negligent conduct of MCOs, is for
Congress to enact legislation. This legislation should not only
reform the ERISA preemption clauses to provide a procedural
mechanism by which consumers can seek redress for their injuries
caused by the tortious conduct of their MCOs, but also to provide
new consumer protections ensuring fair and appropriate treatment
in an MCO-dominated health care market. The Patients' Bill of
Rights Act 07 is narrowly tailored to provide such a procedural
mechanism 10 8 and contains the necessary measures to reform the
appropriate remedy to beneficiaries [according to the applicable state law]"). See
Dukes, 57 F.3d at 359 & n.5. This distinction between quality and quantity made
by the Third Circuit has placed further gloss on the established broad interpreta-
tion of ERISA preemption to the extent that almost any state law claim may be
formulated by its language to avoid preemption, which has the effect of
frustrating the express intent of Congress in creating an extensive statutory
scheme with severe preemption clauses.
106 See infra Part III.A. 1, discussing the need for federal legislative reform
of ERISA as opposed to ad hoc federal judicial relief.
107 H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. (1998).
108 Section 302 of the Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 1998 states:
(a) IN GENERAL- Section 514 of the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. § 1144) is amended by adding at the
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end the following subsection:
'(e) PREEMPTION NOT TO APPLY TO CERTAIN ACTIONS
ARISING OUT OF PROVISION OF BENEFITS-
'(1) IN GENERAL- Except as provided in this subsection, nothing in
this title shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any
cause of action under state law to recover damages resulting from
personal injury or for wrongful death against any person-
'(A) in connection with the provision of insurance, adminis-
trative services, or medical services by such person to or for
a group health plan (as defined in section 733), or
'(B) that arises out of the arrangement by such person for the
provision of such insurance, administrative services, or
medical services by other persons.
'(2) EXCEPTION FOR EMPLOYERS AND OTHER PLAN
SPONSORS-
'(A) IN GENERAL- Subject to subparagraph (B), paragraph
(1) does not authorize-
'(i) any cause of action against an employer or other plan
sponsor maintaining the group health plan, or
'(ii) a right to recovery or indemnity by a person against an
employer or other plan sponsor for damages assessed against
the person pursuant to a cause of action under paragraph (1).
'(B) SPECIAL RULE- Subparagraph (A) shall not preclude
any cause of action described in paragraph (1) against an
employer or other plan sponsor if-
'(i) such action is based on the employer's or other plan
sponsor's exercise of discretionary authority to make a
decision on a claim for benefits covered under the plan or
health insurance coverage in the case at issue; and
'(ii) the exercise by such employer or other plan sponsor of
such authority resulted in personal injury or wrongful death.'
H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. § 302(a)(e) (emphasis added) (amended material in
original included within single quotation marks). The Bill's statutory scheme
explicitly amends section 514, ERISA's express preemption clause. Id. § 302(a).
The Bill ensures that only the party actually or directly responsible for
negligently causing injury to a consumer is held liable, by providing an express
exception from liability for employers and other health plan sponsors, unless
those entities directly cause injury to a consumer while exercising their
discretionary authority to make a decision on the provision of benefits or health
care coverage. See id. § 302(a)(e)(2)(A)-(B).
The Bill's intention to narrowly tailor liability is further illustrated by
section 301(a)(b)(1), where a group health plan or health insurance issuer shall
be treated as satisfying most of the Bill's consumer protection requirements
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
health care system in a manner that will allow both consumers and
MCOs to benefit.109
The consumer protections advocated by the Bill that should, at
a minimum, be adopted by Congress to effectively reform the
ailing health care market, include: (1) mandatory disclosure of
information by group health plans and health insurance issuers to
health care consumers at the time of initial coverage or enroll-
ment;'10 (2) assured consumer choice of varying plan options and
providers offered by a plan or particular issuer;'. (3) immediate
emergency services access irrespective of whether the health care
provider is a participating or nonparticipating server; 12 and (4)
located in title I, see id. §§ 101-08, 143, 152-53, with respect to the benefits it
is required to provide, and will not be considered as failing to meet such
requirements so long as the plan or its representatives did not cause such a
failure by the issuer. Id. § 301(a)(b)(1). However, an MCO's liability with
respect to other consumer protections in title I, such as providing information,
see id. § 121, and establishing an internal and external (independent) appeals
process, shall be determined by the Secretary of Health and Human Resources.
See id. § 301(a)(b)(2)-(4).
Consequently, as opposed to the current system of regulation under ERISA
that preempts virtually all state law actions against MCOs, the Bill would hold
MCOs liable for their direct conduct irrespective of the "quantity and quality"
of services provided, but would not hold them liable for the negligence or
failures of others. See id. § 302(a). See also Easley, supra note 24, at 301, 303-
06 (discussing the narrowing of ERISA preemption by some courts recognizing
a distinction between claims asserting a failure to provide a certain quantity of
services that are preempted by ERISA, and those claims alleging a denial of
quality service, which are not preempted). Moreover, unlike under ERISA, the
Bill most likely would not hold an MCO liable for the torts of the doctors
providing care to a consumer because doctors are usually not classified as
representatives or agents of health plans. See Ronald Smothers, Labor Board
Orders Hearing on Doctor Union, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 10, 1998, at B6 (addressing
the question of who constitutes a "representative" of an MCO for the purposes
of determining liability and noting that doctors have been historically considered
independent contractors and not agents or employees of MCOs).
'09 See H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. § 302(a) (amending ERISA and imposing
direct liability on MCOs in discrete situations). See also infra Part H.B,
discussing the Bill's narrowly tailored statutory scheme.
"o H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. § 121 (1998).
... Id. §§ 102-103.
112 Id. § 101.
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a right to a timely and efficient appeal process, both internal and
independent external review-including an expedited appeal for
medical exigencies-for complaints concerning the plan or issuer's
decisions not to provide coverage.113
These provisions are essential for several reasons. First, under
current law,114 MCOs contracting through private sector employ-
er-provided health plans have escaped responsibility for their
failures to provide appropriate coverage that has already been pur-
chased'1 5 but denied or postponed because of bureaucratic imped-
iments. 116 This, in turn, has created little incentive for MCOs to
113 Id. §§ 131-133.
114 ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994)).
15 See Easley, supra note 24, at 305-09 (discussing the background of
ERISA and lack of liability of MCOs).
116 See Hearing on Grievance Procedures, supra note 37 (statement of Olena
Berg, Asst. Secretary of the Dep't of Labor's Pension and Welfare Benefits
Admin.) (detailing instances of the pervasive use of bureaucratic impediments by
MCOs). For example, Ron Paulich, who had testicular cancer, was regularly
receiving costly injections that were fully covered by his plan. Paulich's provider
was changed by his plan, which had no effect on the pre-purchased benefits he
was entitled to receive from his plan. He was notified, however, that his plan
would no longer cover $180 of the procedure cost. Paulich could not afford that
additional expense and was compelled to undergo castration. Some time after the
castration, Paulich received a letter from his plan informing him that it had been
wrong and that he was actually entitled to the costly injections as part of his pre-
purchased employer-provided health care plan. Because Paulich's MCO did not
have adequate information about his plan nor adequate procedures to inform him
of a right to appeal such denials of coverage, he was forced to suffer without a
vital part of his anatomy and his only ERISA remedy would be to receive the
injection which his plan had denied some time before he was compelled to
undergo castration. See Hearing on Grievance Procedures, supra note 37
(statement of Olena Berg).
In another example, Cheryl Bolinger brought her daughter home from a
complicated back surgery to combat scoliosis. 144 CONG. REC. H935-03 (daily
ed. Mar. 10, 1998) (statement of Cheryl Bolinger). Pursuant to the surgeon's
orders, Bolinger's daughter was to receive nursing care and physical therapy at
home for at least twelve weeks. Nine days later, however, Bolinger's MCO
decided to overrule the surgeon's orders and remove the nurse. When Bolinger
initially complained to her MCO she was told only that a note would be made
of her concern. After Bolinger sent several letters, made numerous phone calls,
and procured many letters of justification, the MCO finally acquiesced and
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reform their practices and provide timely, necessary care until, in
some cases, the patient no longer can be effectively treated..7 or
has died" 8 waiting for coverage.
provided her daughter only the care that one of their expert surgeons had ordered
previously as vital treatment for her daughter's condition without any compensa-
tion for damages incurred as a result of the delay. Id.
Even to an objective observer, the conduct of the above MCOs seems
beyond defense. Both consumers were contractually entitled to receive vital
medical coverage, but were denied coverage because of bureaucratic impediments
and injured as a result. Yet, because their health plans are subject to ERISA,
neither consumer may seek relief beyond the value of the delayed service itself.
See Hearing on Grievance Procedures, supra note 37 (statement of Olena Berg).
See also ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994).
117 For example, Willis Lester had been receiving blood pressure and
cholesterol medications under his fee-for-service plan. See 144 CONG. REC.
S 11,103 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1998) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). When Lester's
employer switched to a managed care plan, the MCO ceased providing him these
medications. Subsequently, Lester suffered a stroke. Lester's physician explained
that the physical therapy plan was limited, making it apparent that the MCOs
denial of care was "impairing" his recovery to an extent that Lester may no
longer be as effectively treated as if he had received the "proper" care from the
beginning. Id.
In another example, a boy's leg was seriously injured in an auto accident.
144 CONG. REc. S 10,819 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1998) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
At a nearby hospital, emergency doctors told the boy's parents that he needed
vascular surgery immediately to save his leg and that a surgeon was available for
such an operation. The boy's MCO, however, insisted that he be transferred to
an "in-network" hospital for the surgery, otherwise it would not pay. By the time
the boy was transferred, his surgery was delayed three hours after the doctors
had advised immediate attention. As a result, the boy lost his leg. Id.
118 Ms. Corklin, a pregnant woman, was advised by her doctor that she
should have 24-hour care during her current pregnancy because she had a
problem with a previous pregnancy. See Hearing on Grievance Procedures,
supra note 37 (statement of Olena Berg, Asst. Secretary of the Dep't of Labor's
Pension and Welfare Benefits Admin.). Instead, the MCO only allowed Corklin
10 hours of care and, as a result, while the care provider was not there her baby
went into fetal distress and died. See Hearing on Grievance Procedures, supra
note 37 (statement of Olena Berg).
There was also the case of Jim Bartee who had developed leukemia. 144
CONG. REc. H7560 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1998) (statement of Rep. Strictland). He
informed his MCO that he only had three weeks to live and his only recourse
was a bone-marrow transplant. The MCO representative responded, "Oh, we
could never get it approved that quickly." The transplant was not approved in
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Second, the Bill will reverse the incentive of managed care
providers to arbitrarily deny or delay coverage because they will no
longer be immune from direct liability.1 9 Further, they will be
liable for more than just the cost of the coverage or benefit that
was wrongly or negligently denied. 120 Indeed, under the Bill,
MCOs would have to provide redress for injuries resulting from
their defective administration of services.
121
Third, the Bill, to the extent it increases the liability of MCOs,
is drafted narrowly to address the consequences of their direct
actions. 122 The Bill, however, does not impose liability, as under
some interpretations of current law, for the indirect conduct of the
managed care organization. 2 3 In fact, the Bill eliminates the need
for consumers to assert a tenuous direct claim against their provider
merely to ensure that they can also assert an indirect vicarious
liability claim against their MCO. 124 Instead, under the Bill,
time and Bartee died. Id.
19 See H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. § 302(a) (1998) (amending ERISA and
imposing direct liability under any state law or cause of action to recover
damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death against any person, in
connection with the provision of insurance, administrative services, or medical
services, including arrangements made by such person thereto). See also Easley,
supra note 24, at 308-12 (discussing the background of ERISA and theories of
direct and vicarious liability).
12 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (discussing the limited
extent of remedies available under ERISA preemption of state law).
121 H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. § 302(a).
122 See supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing the narrow
construction of the Bill, which only imposes liability in specific circumstances
for direct negligence).
123 See Easley, supra note 24, at 311-12 (discussing that some courts have
interpreted the liability of MCOs under ERISA as merely vicarious, creating
incentives for inefficiency and harm to consumers). But see supra note 108
(analyzing the Bill and discussing the fact that its provisions narrowly tailor
liability by providing express exceptions to liability which have the effect of
holding liable only the parties actually responsible for their direct conduct which
causes injury).
124 See infra notes 195-204 and accompanying text (explaining the problems
associated with allowing vicarious liability claims against MCOs to be attached
to direct state law claims against providers).
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consumers can hold their MCO directly accountable for damages
flowing from negligent decision-making.1 25
This ability to file a direct claim against an MCO prevents the
complication of asserting an insincere and merely strategic claim
against a provider. 26 If a claim against a provider, such as
physician malpractice, has merit, it can be effectively addressed
without fear of preemption by a state law action against such
provider individually. 127 Accordingly there is no need to base
liability on tenuous vicarious theories 28 because the Bill would
125 H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. § 302(a).
126 See infra notes 195-197 and accompanying text (asserting that inefficien-
cy and unfairness are the inevitable results of allowing vicarious liability claims
against MCOs to be attached to direct claims against providers).
127 See infra note 199 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that a
direct state law malpractice claim against a provider is independent of ERISA
and not subject to preemption).
128 While virtually every court has found that direct negligence claims are
preempted under ERISA, some courts have interpreted ERISA as allowing
vicarious liability claims against MCOs. See Pacificare of Okla. v. Burrage, 59
F.3d 151, 154-55 (10th Cir. 1995); Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, 57 F.3d 350, 361
(3d Cir. 1995) (holding that a vicarious liability claim against an MCO was
cognizable because it found that a claim alleging that an MCO was liable in its
role as an arranger for actual medical treatment for its plan members was not
preempted); Kearney v. U.S. Healthcare, 859 F. Supp. 182, 186-87 (E.D. Pa.
1994) (holding that ERISA preempts a direct negligence claim, but not its
vicarious liability claim). But see Corporate Health Ins. v. Texas Dep't of Ins.,
12 F. Supp. 2d 597, 616-19 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (holding that MCOs are subject to
direct negligence claims brought under state law, but finding that such claims are
limited to instances when consumers attack the quality of the services actually
provided by the MCOs and not when MCOs merely deny benefits); Ricci v.
Gooberman, 840 F. Supp. 316, 317-18 (D.N.J. 1993) (holding that vicarious
liability claims were preempted).
Under the Bill, however, MCOs are not charged with incidental or vicarious
liability, but still remain liable for the conduct of their representatives. See H.R.
3605, 105th Cong. § 301(a), (b). The term representative within the context of
§ 301(a), (b) seems not to include doctors, who are usually deemed independent
contractors, or employers or other plan sponsors, who are not liable for the
MCO's conduct. See id. § 302(a), (e)(2)(i)-(ii).' See also Smothers, supra note
108, at B6 (asserting the historic view by classifying doctors as independent
contractors and not employees). Moreover, the statutory scheme seems to belie
any other interpretation because § 302(a), (e)(1)-(2) sets up a system where each
party is liable for their own direct discretionary actions.
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allow consumers to hold any culpable party accountable for its
negligent conduct.
12 9
More importantly, the Bill is structured to avoid the need for
litigation at all. Specifically, the Bill employs a balance of front-
end 30 and back-end13 ' regulations to ensure timely delivery of
medical services and to reserve costly court-imposed remedies for
the unusual case that is missed by the health care system, yet
deserving of redress. 132 While the incidence of injuries and need
129 H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. § 302(a). Essentially, the Bill maintains
efficiency and fairness within the private sector employer-provided health care
market, both because it provides an exception to ERISA preemption and because
it preserves the traditional interpretation of ERISA preemption analysis for all
other state law claims, such as physician malpractice, which are not "relate[d] to"
and completely independent of ERISA. See supra note 108 (analyzing the Bill
and detailing the provisions which clearly hold liable only the party actually
responsible for negligent treatment).
130 Front-end regulations are procedures or safeguards, such as disclosure
requirements or internal appeal processes placed near the beginning of the
formation of the relationship between MCOs and consumers to ensure that most
complaints or problems are heard and hopefully solved before injury or
substantial cost is imposed. See Hearing on Grievance Procedures, supra note
37 (statement of Dr. Margaret Hamburg, Asst. Secretary of Planning and the
Evaluation Dep't of Health & Human Services). However, procedures alone are
not enough to protect consumers because there will be always some instances
where the procedure is either never activated or returns a wrong decision, which
could still cause damage and should be compensated. See Hearing on Grievance
Procedures, supra note 37 (statement of Olena Berg, Asst. Secretary of the Dep't
of Labor's Pension and Welfare Benefits Admin.).
131 Back-end regulations are remedial mechanisms, such as external appeal
process or judicial review to ensure that damages are mitigated or obviated if
front-end procedural safeguards fail. See Hearing on Grievance Procedures,
supra note 37 (statement of Dr. Margaret Hamburg, Asst. Secretary of Planning
and the Evaluation Dep't of Health & Human Services).
132 By using both front-end and back-end regulations or procedural
safeguards the need for litigation will be reduced because damages will be
prevented and consumer trust will be increased. See Hearing on Grievance
Procedures, supra note 37 (statement of Dr. Margaret Hamburg, Asst. Secretary
of Planning and the Evaluation Dep't of Health & Human Services). While the
procedural safeguards will not work in every case, the incidence of consumers
having to avail themselves of the back-end or more costly remedial provisions
will decrease when procedures are placed at the front-end to prevent any
damages, in the first instance, occurring as a result of a delay or denial of health
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for remedial protections will definitely decrease with the use of
front-end procedural safe-guards, there is still a need for account-
ability in the system. 133 Remedial provisions are necessary to
ensure that those injuries that are not addressed by front-end
procedural protections can be remedied so as to eliminate the
incentive for MCOs to reduce quality or quantity of care.1
3 1
Indeed, the Bill minimally increases the liability of MCOs when
analyzed within the context of the entire health care system.
135
But liability is only increased to the extent necessary to restore
fairness to the private sector employer-provided health care market
by providing consumers the ability to seek redress for injuries
caused by the negligent decision-making of their MCO.
Finally, the Bill establishes uniform and consistent consumer
protections on the federal level for every application of health care
by allowing consumers to seek redress for the negligence of their
MCOs.'36 While these federal protections are mostly procedural
mechanisms to obtain potential relief under substantive state
remedies, 37 the protections under this Bill often represent
care coverage. See Hearing on Grievance Procedures, supra note 37 (statement
of Olena Berg, Asst. Secretary of the Dep't of Labor's Pension and Welfare
Benefits Admin.).
' See Hearing on Grievance Procedures, supra note 37 (statement of Olena
Berg, Asst. Secretary of the Dep't of Labor's Pension and Welfare Benefits
Admin.) (asserting that an effective health care system requires a safety valve,
where consumers may hold MCOs liable for their negligent treatment decisions
when the procedural protections fail).
134 See Hearing on Grievance Procedures, supra note 37 (statement of Olena
Berg, Asst. Secretary of the Dep't of Labor's Pension and Welfare Benefits
Admin.). But see ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994) (allowing
consumers to recover the value of treatments and to enforce and clarify rights
under their plan).
135 See supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that the
Bill imposes liability on MCOs, but only in situations where the direct conduct
of an MCO caused the consumer's injury).
136 See supra text accompanying notes 110-113 (detailing the consumer
protections provided by the Bill).
137 See H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. §§ 101-103, 121, 131-133, 302 (1998).
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substative standards that may serve as a model for underlying state
laws or enforcement provisions.'38
B. The Procedural Mechanism to Reverse Adverse
Incentives of MCOs
The most important aspect of the Bill, or any newly drafted
legislative reform of the health care system, is that it contains a
procedure by which essential consumer protections may be
implemented to provide narrowly tailored relief ensuring the
delivery of reasonable care. 139 In contrast, a legislative scheme
which merely adds federal remedies to ERISA, rather than
amending the harsh effects of its preemption clauses to allow
138 The fact that recovery may be provided under analogous state law
provisions will encourage those states that want reliable consumer protections in
the health care system to draft legislation; whereas the states that desire less
regulation and fewer protections can choose not to draft such legislation that
could provide a vehicle for recovery under state law. See supra notes 32 and
161.
It is irrelevant to the present need for reform that some of the provisions of
the Bill may overlap with other statutes that currently afford consumer
protections or represent legislative reform of the health care system which has
been already enacted. See Robert Pear, Health Insurers' Skirting New Laws,
Officials Report, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1997, at Al (explaining that the Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, for example, specifically targeted the
need for emergency care to ensure that patients would receive it regardless of
whether the hospital is a participating member of their MCO). Similarly, the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 attacked the problem
of coverage for pre-existing medical conditions. Robert Pear, Move Under Way
to Try to Block Health Care Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1997, at Al (asserting
that "proposals [usually are] ... an effort to accomplish, in an incremental way,
some of the goals . . . pursued . . . in [a] plan for national health insurance").
Thus, while the problems addressed by the Bill may have been partially
addressed, additional reform is necessary to cure the overall defects in the entire
health care market, especially with respect to access to reasonable care and
assurance that injuries caused by the negligence of MCOs will be redressed.
"9 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (explaining that the
incentives of MCOs to deny and delay care must be adjusted so as to encourage
reasonable delivery of health care).
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consumers to seek redress,14 ° ignoring concerns of federalism
41
140 See Jeffrey E. Shuren, Legal Accountability for Utilization Review in
ERISA Health Plans, 77 N.C. L. REV. 731, 776-82 (1999) (arguing that Congress
should create a duty of care requirement on MCOs and allow a direct cause of
action against MCOs under federal statutory provisions, ignoring federalism and
judicial economy concerns).
141 As a general policy concern, federalism ideally instructs to balance power
between the federal and state governments, where the federal government is
delegated limited, enumerated powers while the states are provided the
remainder, including general police powers to legislate so as to protect the
"health and safety" of their citizens. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting
Congress its enumerated legislative-powers), §§ 9-10 (proscribing state actions);
id. amend. X (granting states all powers not reserved to the Federal government,
nor prohibited by the Constitution).
Federalism is not a restraint on the judiciary only. It is a well accepted
principle which counsels against interfering with a Republican form of
government that diffuses power among the three branches of the Federal
government and the several States. See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M.
SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW pt. 2, at 87-89 (13th ed. 1997). Federalism
concerns counsel against treading on the traditional powers exercised by either
the federal or state governments. See, e.g., Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156,
1167 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding that ERISA, a federal law, usually does not
preempt areas where states traditionally exercise authority, unless there is some
clearly expressed direction under federal legislative power to set national,
majoritarian policies); Hook v. Morrison Milling Co., 38 F.3d 776, 781 (5th Cir.
1994) (finding ERISA preemption "remains subject to the traditional principle
of federalism"). While federalism is not an absolute rule, it should be addressed
when countenancing important legislative reform effecting both the federal and
state governments. See, e.g., Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 513
(1982) (reversing the decision below creating a new rule based merely on
federalism concerns, and holding that "policy considerations alone cannot justify
not following precedent unless it is consistent with congressional intent").
Congress should directly address federalism concerns, in areas of traditional
import to state governments, and because of the important governmental and
social policy concerns underlying the principle of federalism. See Hearing on
Grievance Procedures, supra note 37 (statement of Dr. Margaret Hamburg, Asst.
Secretary of Planning and the Evaluation Dep't of Health & Human Services)
(recognizing the need for Congress to assess the impact of ERISA legislative
reform on state powers). These policy concerns include: the states' interests in
developing and enforcing policies which protect their citizens and comport with
local needs, assured accountability and best possible representation for citizens
of the several States, and a check on any arbitrary or capricious power. See, e.g.,
Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d 900, 911-12 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding that
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and judicial economy.142 Such a legislative scheme frustrates the
efficient and effective delivery of private sector employer-provided
health care.
Specifically, the Bill creates a statutory scheme that announces,
in general, that it "shall not ... supersede any provision of state
federalism concerns address important social policies, such as: a "state['s] ...
constitutionally based interest in autonomously running the ... government to
the fullest extent possible"), rev'd on other grounds, 457 U.S. 496, 513 (1982)
(finding social policy concerns important, but noting that the Court should wait
for Congress to act when there was clear precedent). These concerns suggest that
a federal legislative plan that provides a universal and uniform procedure on the
federal level, but allows state substantive law to provide redress, is better suited
to cure the defects of ERISA than a plan providing relief on the federal level
without counseling state interests. Moreover, Congress should follow the lead of
the states that have already enacted comprehensive consumer protection
provisions geared toward discouraging MCOs from ignoring the needs of their
consumers. These innovative remedial schemes should be effectuated on the
federal level so consumers in health care plans subject to ERISA may have equal
protection from MCO negligence as the consumers of non-ERISA plans have.
142 See Hearing on Grievance Procedures, supra note 37 (statement of Dr.
Margaret Hamburg, Asst. Secretary of Planning and the Evaluation Dep't of
Health & Human Services) (asserting implicitly that judicial economy concerns
are addressed by a legislative scheme that employs front-end procedural
protections because those protections provide essential relief to consumers before
damages occur and obviate the need for judicial review). See also infra note 191
and accompanying text (discussing the fact that it is unclear whether ERISA
contemplated a federal common law).
Federal remedies by themselves are impractical because it is inefficient and
expensive to administer a form of federal tort law requiring expansion,
development, or redevelopment of a federal common law to address negligence
claims solely under the ERISA framework covering over 125 million consumers
of private sector employer-provided health care. See, e.g., Patsy, 634 F.2d at
911-12 (finding that state remedies are "generally simpler, speedier, and less
expensive [and] improve [efficiency] ... of the process itself'). In contrast, state
courts are better equipped for the task, because these courts are more attuned to
the needs of local citizens, they may utilize well developed common law in the
area of consumer protection and health and safety, and they have practice
interpreting various state laws addressing the same issues which sprout from
litigation against MCOs. Id. (asserting that a state is "able to hone its [laws] ...
to comply with federal requirements ... without losing the advantage of [its
expertise,] ... familiarity with the local conditions[,] and awareness of the
impact of a particular action").
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law... [subject to paragraph (2) of the section and] except to the
extent [it] prevents the application [of the standards of this
title].' 43 This statutory scheme, however, does not appear to
allow for any modification of section 514 of ERISA that preempts
the application of state law remedies against employer-provided
health plans. 1" In fact, paragraph (2) of the Bill explicitly asserts
that "[n]othing in this title shall be construed to affect or modify
... section 514 .. .with respect to group health plans."'145 Thus,
as a general rule, the Bill provides that state law remedies are
applicable in conjunction with its own provisions, unless: (1) the
state law contradicts the requirements of the Bill; 146 or (2) section
514 preempts the application of the state law to the employer-
provided health plan. 14
7
However, the exception allowing section 514 to preempt state
law has its own limitations. 148 While this exception is derived
from section 192(a)(2) of the Bill, stating that "nothing" shall affect
or modify provisions of section 514 that have been found to
preempt the applicability of state law remedies against health
plans,'49 it must be interpreted and read within the context of the
entire Bill. The term "nothing" as used within the context of the
language of the Bill must mean there are "no" modifications made,
in general, to the ability of section 514 to preempt state law
remedies because the Bill expressly amends ERISA 5 ° in narrow-
ly structured circumstances that provide for the specific situations
where state law action against health care plans are not preempt-
ed.' 5'
14' H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. § 192(a)(1) (1998).
'44 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994).
14 H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. § 192(a)(2).
146 Id. § 192(a)(1).
141 Id. § 192(a)(2).
148 Id. § 302 (ERISA Preemption Not to Apply to Certain Actions Involving
Health Insurance Policyholders).
149 Id. § 192(a)(2).
"' Id. § 301(a) (asserting that ERISA "is amended by adding ... the ...
new section: . . . '(a) ... a group health plan[] and health insurance issuer...
shall comply with the requirements [and standards imposed by] .. .title I"').
151 Id. § 302(a) (Preemption Not to Apply to Certain Actions Arising Out of
Provision of Health Benefits). See also supra note 108 (analyzing the Bill and
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There are three reasons demonstrating the importance of
incorporating a narrowly tailored procedure, such as the one
contained in the Bill, which employs consumer protections152 to
secure redress from the culpable conduct of MCOs. 153 First, such
a procedure exposes MCOs to liability for their direct actions under
state tort law and reverses the current incentive for MCOs to
negligently deny or delay consumers' health care coverage in the
name of cost containment and higher profits. 54 MCOs are there-
fore encouraged to become sensitive to the needs of consumers
when developing business policies, so as to cure consumers'
distrust of the private-sector employer-provided health care market
and restore market efficiency. 155
discussing that its provisions narrowly tailor liability by providing express
exceptions to liability which have the effect of holding liable only the parties
actually responsible for their direct conduct which causes injury).
52 The consumer protections are incorporated into the Bill in the following
sections: H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. § 101 (Access to Emergency Care), § 102
(Offering Choice of Coverage Options under Group Health Plans), § 103 (Choice
of Providers), § 121 (Patient Information), § 131 (Establishment of Grievance
Process), § 132 (Internal Appeals and Adverse Determinations), and § 133
(External Appeals of Adverse Determinations).
153 See H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. (providing procedural provisions, including:
§ 192(a)(1) which is the general rule recognizing the importance of federalism
and respecting the legitimate interest that states have in enforcing their laws to
deter tortious conduct and to compensate their citizens who are wrongfully
injured, to the extent such laws do not frustrate the purpose of the federal
statutory scheme; § 192(a)(2), the broad exception to the general rule, which
practically swallows-up the rule, purports to honor and maintain the strong
statutory preemption doctrine of ERISA, and ensures that the intent of Congress
to replace a patchwork scheme of state regulations with a uniform set of federal
regulations is preserved; and § 302(a), the narrowly tailored limitation on the
broad-based exception-ERISA preemption-which provides the specific
circumstances where state law actions are not preempted and respects the
importance of the ability of the states to provide their injured citizens adequate
relief within the context of the health care system).
114 See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text (explaining that the Bill
reverses the incentive of MCOs to deny or delay coverage because it provides
a procedure to seek redress for the direct negligence of MCOs under state law).
"' In any ordered, free-market society, suppliers, such as MCOs, must be
concerned with the needs or demand of their consumers to ensure efficiency.
This efficiency, in theory, only occurs at the point where consumers' demand for
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The next two reasons indicating the value of adopting a
narrowly tailored procedure are derived from its narrow construc-
tion. 56 First, because health care has been historically under both
state and federal control, 15 7 federalism concerns are addressed
when consumer redress procedures are narrowly constructed and
a good, such as health care, crosses the amount or supply of that good provided.
See THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 301 (David W. Pearce ed.,
4th ed. 1992). Although a consumer's inability to hold a supplier liable, or, more
appropriately, a consumer's lack of confidence in obtaining a satisfactory good,
may be characterized as a transaction cost-not factored into neoclassical
economic theory-it should be deemed reflected in the data which determines
consumer demand because it is a controlling factor in any consumer's preference
for a good. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM A. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS
459, 545 (13th ed. 1989). See also Kneave Riggall, Comprehensive Tax Base
Theory, Transaction Costs, and Economic Efficiency: How to Tax Our Way to
Efficiency, 17 VA. TAX REV. 295, 339 (1997) (describing transaction costs as the
friction that prevents economic resources from flowing to their most productive
uses and stating that "[miany transactions costs are the product of laws that, if
changed would allow the economy to be more efficient... [or] the absence of
laws ... that would foster economic activity") (emphasis added). In a free
market, if consumers are unsure of attaining reasonable health care and distrust
the marketplace, they will demand less care on the market and either consume
less or supplement traditional health care supplied by MCOs with alternatives.
But, because ERISA preempts direct liability claims against MCOs for pre-
purchased services, the supply of MCO provided health care has been artificially
decreased, causing market inefficiency. See, e.g., David S. Peck, Economic
Analysis of the Allocation of Liability for Cargo Damage: The Case for the
Carrier, Or is It?, 26 TRANSP. L.J. 73, 83-84 (1998) (explaining that supply
normally increases to meet demand and returns a price at equilibrium, but due
to a supervening cause the supply may not increase, creating greater profits for
the supplier). In effect ERISA preemption increases the profits of MCOs by
denying consumers complete access to their pre-purchased health care. See supra
notes 114-118 and accompanying text (asserting that MCOs subject to ERISA
have failed to provide appropriate coverage and often deny or postpone coverage
without fear of liability for negligence). Therefore, to restore consumer trust,
market efficiency, and a sense of fair play, federal legislation must be enacted
to amend ERISA's defects.
156 See supra note 108 (discussing the Bill's narrow construction in greater
detail).
157 See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987) (discussing
that the enactment of ERISA was for the purpose of replacing the patchwork of
state law regulations with uniform federal law).
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the power to regulate and enforce those procedures is allocated
between the federal and state governments. 5 8 The federalism
concern is arguably at its peak in circumstances where both the
health and safety of states' citizens are at stake and the legislative
powers of Congress to set national policies are threatened. 5 9
Because both the federal and state governments have legitimate
interests in the subject of the federal legislation,1 60 it is important
that both bodies have input in the regulation process. Accordingly,
the Bill is well suited to maintain federalism because it properly
balances power between the federal and state governments. This
balance, placing authority in the federal government to create the
procedural consumer protections and power in the state govern-
ments to enforce these protections through substantive remedial
laws, 16 1 is proper in light of the congressional intent under
158 See supra note 141 (discussing federalism).
159 Where there is federal regulation in an area, such as health and safety,
which is traditionally regulated by the states, the powers of the federal and state
governments overlap. Both bodies have a legitimate interest in controlling or
shaping the law in that area because Congress has a substantial interest in the
adherence to its legislative pronouncements and clearly expressed policy
objectives made pursuant to its Commerce Clause power, while the states have
a substantial interest in protecting their citizens. See U.S. CONST. art. VI
(guarantying that, to the extent that federal law is constitutional and legitimately
enforced, states cannot contradict or frustrate its objectives); id. amend. X
(guarantying that the states have the power to legislate in all areas other than
those within the limited powers of Congress).
'6o However, depending on the intent of Congress to cover the field or
completely preempt an area subject to federal law, states may regulate in the
same area as a federal law. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy
Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 219-20 (1983) (holding
that licensing or inspecting mandated by federal statute did not create a
legislative scheme that occupied the entire area or field, nor prevented state
regulation in that same area). The fact that Congress, even with limited powers,
may, when expressly or implicitly provided by statute, so constrain states' power
to regulate in one of its traditional areas, demonstrates that federal legislation is
often necessary to correct or cure clearly expressed federal laws, such as the
ERISA preemption clauses, which have become unworkable.
16' This will encourage those states that want reliable consumer protections
in the health care system to draft legislation, if not already in existence, that is
analogous to the Bill. Conversely, states that desire less regulation and fewer
protections can choose not to draft legislation that could provide a vehicle for
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ERISA to maintain a uniform set of regulations.1 62 Moreover,
recovery under state law. See, e.g., Mary Beth Denefe & Robert W. Brunner,
Managed Care Liability Under Illinois Law, 86 ILL. B.J. 536, 536-37 (1998)
(providing a good example of how states may afford consumers relief from their
MCO's negligence by noting that Texas, in 1997, became the first state to
establish a cause of action for negligence against an MCO and that Illinois may
follow); Laurie McGiley, Texas Law Allowing Patients to Sue Health Plans for
Damages is Upheld, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 1998, at B10 (noting same and that
Missouri has adopted a similar law). Even though the Bill creates a procedure
that determines the circumstances that will create liability for MCOs, the actual
recovery may be obtained only through state law, not federal law. See H.R. 3605,
105th Cong. § 302(a)(e)(1). Hence, uniform consumer protection standards in the
health care system would be available under federal law, but whether an actual
remedy may be obtained is left to the discretion of each state legislature. See id.
Therefore, the constitutional principle of federalism is maintained, while uniform
federal protections are made available.
However, commentators may argue that because States have taken the lead
recently in attempting to regulate the accountability of MCOs coupled with the
holding of a federal district court in Texas that such a state law provision was
not preempted by ERISA, federal legislation providing similar protections for
consumers is not needed. See, e.g., Corporate Health Ins. v. Texas Dep't of Ins.,
12 F. Supp. 2d 597, 614-20 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (holding that a Texas law imposing
liability on MCOs was not preempted by ERISA because the State statute
addresses the "quality" of benefits "actually" provided and not benefits denied).
This argument is flawed because it would allow state law to infringe upon the
clearly defined statutory interpretation and legislative history of ERISA, in
contravention of the doctrines of stare decisis and separation of powers. It would
also create divergent and inconsistent applications of federal law, which would
unnecessarily tax judicial resources and fail to provide MCOs or consumers
sufficient notice to conform their conduct to the law. See infra Part III.A.1,
discussing the principles counseling against allowing ad hoc judicial remedies in
greater detail. In addition, even the holding in Corporate Health Insurance
encouraged Congress to refine ERISA. Charles Omstein, Judge Upholds State
Law that Lets Patients Sue Over HMO Denials But Ruling Strikes Much of
Independent Review Process, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 19, 1998, at Al
(quoting the federal judge upholding the Texas law against an ERISA preemption
challenge, who stated that "[i]f Congress wants the American citizens to have
access to adequate health care, then Congress must accept its responsibility to
define the scope of ERISA preemption and to enact legislation that will ensure
every patient has access to that care").
162 See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 46 (discussing that the enactment of ERISA
for the purpose of replacing the patchwork of state law regulations with uniform
federal law).
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under the Bill, federal law remains supreme because relief through
state law is primarily necessary only in the unusual case that
escapes the front-end consumer protections. 1
63
Second, judicial economy is preserved when consumer redress
procedures are narrowly tailored, even though they technically
increase liability for MCOs. To the extent the liability of MCOs is
increased, the Bill's consumer protection provisions employ a
system with front-end and back-end regulations to address
grievances before judicial review is necessary."64 This eliminates
the possibility that there will be a flood of litigation because the
Bill's requirements for extensive information disclosure before
enrollment, and an internal and external appeal, will address and
resolve a number of complaints and appeals before any damage has
occurred. 165 Consequently, in most cases, the narrow construction
of the Bill and its system of protections will prevent or at least
mitigate injury. This, in turn, will save the courts' resources for the
rare cases where the system fails to address or remedy the
complaint through both an internal or external, independent appeal
process.
III. EFFECTIVE UNIVERSAL REFORM OF THE HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM
A. A Superior Method of Reform
The enactment of the Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 1998 or
other federal legislation containing similar key provisions repre-
sents a superior method for reform when compared to other
163 See supra note 153 (noting the provisions of the Bill that create a
narrowly tailored procedural mechanism).
164 See supra text accompanying notes 110-113 & 130-131 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the key protections provided by the Bill and asserting that
the Bill places regulations in the front and back end of the relationship formed
between consumers and MCOs, which will likely reduce most of the need for
judicial review).
165 See H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. § 121 (1998) (Patient Information), § 131
(Establishment of a Grievance Process), § 132 (Internal Appeals and Adverse
Determinations), § 133 (External Appeals and Determinations).
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approaches advocated by commentators. These alternative ap-
proaches include: (1) federal judicial review, which fashions relief
on an ad hoc basis while completely abandoning the Supreme
Court's precedent on the ERISA preemption clauses; 166 (2)
creation of a system, whether legislatively or judicially created,
which provides unjustified recovery for vicarious claims;'67 and
(3) legislative reform, focusing solely on federalism ideals and
thereby balancing federal and state authority too delicately with
respect to health care, while failing to provide any governmental
body with enforcement power allowing consumers the ability to
seek redress. 168
These alternative approaches do not provide effective methods
of reform, because they encroach on the constitutional doctrines of
stare decisis 16 and separation of powers. 170 In contrast, the Bill
166 Some commentators propose the radical narrowing or complete
abandonment of both the Supreme Court's interpretation of ERISA's preemption
clauses and its understanding of ERISA's legislative history to fashion relief for
consumers on an ad hoc basis through federal judicial review. See Rebecca S.
Fellman-Caldwell, New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.: The Supreme Court Clarifies ERISA Preemp-
tion, 45 CATH. U. L. REv. 1309, 1315-19, 1350 (1996) (asserting that the
Travelers Court adequately narrowed the application of ERISA preemption, so
as to allow ad hoc relief). See also Grosso, supra note 44, at 450-51.
167 See Grosso, supra note 44, at 450-51 (advocating vicarious liability,
whether judicially or legislatively created). See also Easley, supra note 24, at
313-14, 318 (asserting vicarious liability as necessary to ensure that MCOs are
held liable for negligent conduct, and only advocating reform legislation because
courts have been unwilling or unable to fashion ad hoc relief for consumers).
168 See Farrell, supra note 97, at 252-54 (advocating legislation as the only
effective method of reform while unrealistically insisting on a model of
"managed federalism" poorly adapted to the private market for insurance).
169 "[S]tare decisis is a principle of policy [which] ... is a basic self-
governing [mechanism] ... within the Judicial Branch [that] is entrusted with
the sensitive and difficult task of fashioning and preserving a jurisprudential
system that is not based upon an arbitrary discretion." See Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (citing Boys Markets Inc. v. Retail
Clerks, 398 U.S. 235, 241 (1970); THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 490 (Alexander
Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888)).
170 The separation of powers doctrine was originally derived from dicta in
McCulloch v. Maryland, when Chief Justice Marshall pronounced that "where
the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any of the objects
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respects those doctrines. As an act of Congress, the Bill would
properly amend the Federal Judiciary's precedents, thereby
maintaining the credibility of the Federal Courts17' and preserving
stability, predictability, uniformity, efficiency, and fairness within
the law.172 It would also establish uniform, federal protections to
provide relief through state law actions. 73 As a result, the Bill
narrowly constructs the scope of liability and firmly allocates its
enforcement regime to the states.
entrusted to the government, to undertake here to inquire into the degree of its
necessity, would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department,
and to tread on legislative ground [and t]his court disclaims all pretensions to
such power." 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819) (emphasis added). This
doctrine has since been applied in several circumstances which involve the
interaction between the powers of Congress and the Judicial Branch. One such
circumstance arises when a court is compelled to follow and interpret a statute
enacted by Congress. In that circumstance, the court must be, when the statute
is clear, bound by its normal or established application, unless, in the rare case,
that plain language of the statute would lead to "patently absurd consequences."
Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470 (1989) (citing
Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)).
Moreover, just as it is the judicial department's duty to say what law is,
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), "it is equally-and
emphatically-the exclusive province of the Congress not only to formulate
legislative policies and mandate programs and projects, but also to establish their
relative priority for our Nation." Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 194 (1978). Thus, once Congress has decided the order of priorities and
extent of remedies in a certain area, it is for the courts to enforce those remedies
when sought and it is not within the courts' power nor expertise to shape a
remedy when Congress has acted in that area. See id.
171 See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864-69
(1992) (asserting that a court must take care to speak and act in ways that are
grounded in principle and not merely in compromises that are the result of social
and political pressures, because such principled decisions are upon what a court's
credibility depends).
172 See EVA H. HANKS ET AL., ELEMENTS OF LAW 174-180 (1994) (catalogu-
ing defenses of the doctrine of precedent).
"' See supra notes 32 & 161 (explaining that the Bill provides federal
procedural protections and affords substantive remedies under state law).
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1. Federal Judicial Review versus Federal Legislation
Commentators have advocated radically narrowing ERISA
preemption analysis by abandoning over two decades of prece-
dents 174 that broadly defined ERISA preemption'75 through the
use of federal judicial review and the provision of ad hoc judicial
remedies. 176 Utilizing this same federal judicial review to reform
ERISA requires courts to abandon their prior decisions construing
ERISA and its supporting legislative history and to reinterpret and
narrow the established preemption analysis. This approach is
inferior to federal legislative reform crafted with the essential
mandates contained in the Bill 177 and it fails to afford a truly
effective method of reform.
Such federal judicial review treads on the constitutional
doctrines of stare decisis and separation of powers and thus is not
the most effective method for reforming ERISA. There is no
significant authority supporting the use of an approach, such as
federal judicial review, which displaces an established statutory
174 See Caldwell, supra note 166, at 1315-19, 1350 (asserting that the
Supreme Court in Travelers adequately narrowed the application of ERISA
preemption, so as to allow courts to provide consumers ad hoc relief which
implicitly rejects the need for legislation); Grosso, supra note 44, at 450-51
(advocating recognition of enterprise liability or allowing consumers to assert
claims of vicarious and direct negligence whether judicially or legislatively
created, and asserting that federal courts can and should narrow preemption
analysis and fashion ad hoc remedies for consumers).
... See supra Part I.B.2, discussing the development of the judicial
interpretation of ERISA's preemption analysis and statutory construction.
176 The effects of the Supreme Court's abandonment of the previously broad
construction of ERISA preemption implicitly necessitates that courts take a far
greater role in employer-provided health care disputes by reviewing the merits
of employees' state law claims, rather than simply giving effect to the traditional
construction of ERISA's preemption clause and refusing to hear claims that
would threaten the uniform application of ERISA regulations. See Caldwell,
supra note 166, at 1347, 1350. See also Grosso, supra note 44, at 450
(advocating judicial review further narrowing ERISA preemption and entertaining
vicarious liability claims on the basis of the Court's decision in Travelers).
177 See supra text accompanying notes 110-113 (detailing the key consumer
protections provided by the Bill).
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scheme and abandons the traditional understanding of its legislative
history.178 The failure to comport with both the doctrines of stare
decisis and separation of powers creates instability, unpredictability,
inefficiency, and unfairness.'7 9 Thus, utilizing judicial review to
reform ERISA unjustifiably distorts a statutory scheme which
consumers depend on for the delivery of reasonable health care and
178 In contrast, most authority counsels against judicial interference with
congressionally created statutory schemes, like ERISA, that are clearly intended
to cover the field. See, e.g., United States v. National Treasury Employees
Union, 513 U.S. 454, 478-79 (1995) (asserting that a court should avoid
"tampering" with a staute's and modifying and crafting its own remedies, so as
to avoid treading on the powers of the legislature); Public Citizen v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470 (1989) (asserting that a court is bound
to apply the normal or established application of a statute when the statute's text
is clear); Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union of America, 451 U.S.
77, 91-95 (1981) (asserting that in matters of statutory construction, a court
should examine the language, structure or coverage, and legislative history of the
statute, and where its language is clear, the structure is comprehensive, or the
history is informative, defer to Congress' intention to cover the field); Hanover
Bank v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 369 U.S. 672, 687-88 (1962)
(asserting that where a statute uses plain and ordinary language or the legislative
history is persuasive, it evidences a clear congressional intent to exclusively
manage or control a certain field); Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers and
Warehouse Union v. Steinberg, 32 F.3d 269, 272 (7th Cir. 1994) (asserting that
courts should be especially unwilling to overrule established statutory construc-
tion when the interpretation was dependent on a statute, like ERISA, with a clear
congressional intention to cover the field).
179 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (stating that "[s]tare
decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded [or fair],
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on
judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the
judicial process"). Moreover, "once Congress has addressed a national concern,
[a court's] fundamental commitment to the separation of powers precludes [it]
from scrutinizing the sufficiency of the Congressional solution." Illinois v.
Illinois Outboard Marine, 680 F.2d 473, 478 (7th Cir. 1982). Therefore, when an
approach to reform ERISA contravenes both the doctrines of stare decisis and
separation of powers, consumers of employer-provided health care will be
adversely affected because inconsistent, unfair, and unpredictable applications of
ERISA's statutory scheme will upset the delivery of health care.
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prevents both consumers and MCOs from properly conforming
their behavior to the law."8 °
Moreover, by overemphasizing the effect of the narrowing of
ERISA preemption by the Supreme Court in New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Insurance Co.,' 8' commentators who support the use of judicial
review to reform ERISA fail to justify completely abrogating the
Supreme Court's understanding of ERISA. 182 In Travelers, the
Court merely chose to treat the terms "relates to" and "connection
with," which were utilized to assess the relationship between
ERISA and state laws, as static and uninformative without breaking
or departing from its traditional interpretation of ERISA's statutory
construction and legislative history.1 83 As the Court in Travelers
180 See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987) (noting
that ERISA's purpose of fostering "uniformity of decision... is designed to...
help administrators, fiduciaries, and participants to predict the legality of
proposed actions").
... 514 U.S. 645 (1995). See also Caldwell, supra note 166, at 1341-42
(using language such as "stray from," "break with," and "departed from" when
characterizing the effect the Court's decision in Travelers had on traditional
preemption analysis).
182 Commentators advocating judicial review to reform ERISA have
attempted to narrow the previous interpretation of ERISA preemption based
solely on the Supreme Court's decision in Travelers, which merely explained that
the meaning of some of the terms underlying the traditional understanding of
ERISA preemption were not informative in the Court's ratification of the
traditional understanding of ERISA's statutory scheme. See Travelers, 514 U.S.
at 655-57. See also supra notes 95-97 and accompanying. text (discussing the
Court's decision in Travelers in greater detail).
83 See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655-57 (noting that the terms "relate to" and
"connection with," language utilized by the Supreme Court in its initial
interpretation of ERISA, were not helpful in making the determination of which
state law claims were or were not preempted; however, the Court did not have
to look any farther than the "objectives" and intent underlying ERISA to make
its determination). Any other interpretation of Travelers is untenable in light of
the fact that Congress created a clear statutory scheme and express preemption
provisions. See ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994); ERISA § 514(a),
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). Moreover, unlike the difficulty of interpreting
congressional silence and its various conflicting inferences, there are no possible
interpretations of ERISA which could alter the clear statements and intentions of
Congress to maintain a uniform, federal statutory scheme with minimal
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expressly recognized in reasserting this traditional view, the framers
of ERISA clearly intended to maintain regulatory consistency to
reduce complexities in administering employee benefit plans, by
expressly creating dual preemption clauses preventing the applica-
tion of the many varied state and local restraints on such plans. 84
In fact, the Supreme Court, in De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Medical &
Clinical Services Fund,18' denied an opportunity to confirm these
commentators' contention that the Court supports the abandonment
of traditional preemption analysis and departure from the statutory
construction of ERISA. In De Buono, the Court upheld the core
understanding of ERISA preemption which has been followed for
interference from state or local law. See supra notes 68-69 (asserting that the
established statutory structure of ERISA was intended to preempt the field for
federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent state
and local regulation of employee benefit plans). Commentators advocating reform
through the federal judiciary, however, implicitly attempt to transform the
enactment of ERISA into a situation of congressional silence merely because its
language is broad. This argument is not persuasive considering that such
language was made purposefully broad to effectuate its intent and not to allow
courts to displace an expressly intended statutory scheme. See supra notes 68-69
(same). In fact, the Supreme Court has stated that ERISA's preemption clauses
Set forth a comprehensive civil enforcement scheme that represents a
careful balancing of the need for prompt and fair claims settlement
procedures against the public interest in encouraging the formation of
• employee benefit plans. The policy choices reflected in the inclusion
of certain and the exclusion of others under the federal scheme would
be completely undermined if ERISA plan participants ... were free to
obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in ERISA.
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987) (emphasis added).
Consequently, the Supreme Court's established interpretation of ERISA compels
that any substantive modification of this explicitly created statutory scheme must
be undertaken by Congress, and not the courts, unless there is a special and
compelling justification for an abrogation of clear legislative intent.
184 See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656-57 (finding that Congress intended "to
ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform body of
benefits law; the goal was to minimize the administrative and financial burden
of complying with directives among the States"). See also Cigna Health Plan of
La. v. Louisiana, 82 F.3d 642, 649 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that the holding in
Travelers limited and specifically avowed not to abandon the Supreme Court's
prior understanding of ERISA preemption nor its underlying legislative intent).
165 520 U.S. 806 (1997).
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over the last two decades. 86 This most likely signals the Court's
reliance on its previous holdings that only Congress has the power
to amend established rules based on statutory interpretation.'87
Even assuming that the abandonment of precedent and
established statutory construction derived from ERISA's legislative
history is supported by a "special and compelling justification," '88
utilizing federal judicial review to assess the status of state law
claims under ERISA on a case-by-case basis is inefficient and
provides unpredictable and divergent results.'89 In fact, abandon-
ing the established broad, bright-line rule of preemption in favor of
a preemption analysis which lacks any consistent underlying rules
or standards to guide the determination of relief under state
law' 90 is very likely to tempt courts to create a federal common
186 See id. at 814 n.9 (quoting California Div. of Labor Standards Enforce-
ment v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 519 U.S. 316, 333-34 (1997)). See also id. at
814-16 (holding that a state law imposing a tax on hospitals owned by ERISA
plans is not preempted because it is a law of general applicability imposing
minimal burdens on the administration of the ERISA plans, and hence does not
"relate to" the ERISA plans).
187 But see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23-24 (1980) (recognizing that
courts have ability to fashion remedies supplemental to Congressional statutory
schemes based on sound judicial policy making if Congress did not expressly
prohibit such relief). The Carlson holding was later abandoned by the Court. See
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (declining to provide new
substantive legal liability without legislative aid or common law). In fact., no
case, including Carlson, has suggested that courts may completely abrogate
established interpretations of statutory construction and legislative intent where
Congress so clearly and directly manifested its intent to preempt the field and
assume sole regulation of a particular subject matter. See Carlson, 446 U.S. at
23-24. The only proper recourse is to allow the political process and Congress
to fashion reforms on a statute adopted with a clear purpose and specific scheme.
188 See Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989)
(quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) (stating that "any
departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification")).
189 See, e.g., Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d 900, 911-12 (5th Cir.
1981) (explaining that state law is generally simpler and less expensive and
noting that state courts, as opposed to federal courts, are more accustomed to
dealing with legal remedies traditionally provided by state law), rev'd on other
grounds, 457 U.S. 496, 513 (1982).
" See supra notes 169-170 and accompanying text (discussing the radical
narrowing of ERISA preemption and the abandoning of previous precedents
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law system of relief.' 9' Such a system will tax more judicial
resources than if the courts simply wait for Congress to amend the
express statutory scheme and provide rules or standards from which
to allow uniform, consistent relief. 92 Because courts have less
expertise than Congress in providing broad based remedies not
limited to the context of a particular case, ad hoc remedies created
on a case by case basis will create inconsistencies and confusion
in the law. Thus, efficiency and judicial economy concerns counsel
against adopting the federal judicial review approach to reform the
problems associated with ERISA preemption.
In contrast, the use of legislative reform is clearly superior to
ad hoc judicial review because it corrects the problems with
ERISA1 93 without forcing the federal judiciary either to abandon
precedents and established interpretations of statutory construction
and legislative history, or to usurp legislative power. This prevents
the contravention of the doctrines of stare decisis and separation of
through the use of judicial review to reform ERISA are in contravention of the
doctrines of stare decisis and separation of powers).
191 There is conflicting case law as to whether ERISA even contemplates the
creation of a "federal common law" by the judiciary to assist with administering
the statutory scheme. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union
of America, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981) (emphasizing that the federal lawmaking
power is vested in the legislative, not the judicial, branch of government;
therefore "federal common law" is subject to the authority of Congress, the only
exception being "admiralty law"); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304,
313-15 (1981) (holding that federal common law is subject to the paramount
authority of Congress, and where Congress has occupied the field and established
a comprehensive regulatory program, the courts will never be deemed to have
been apportioned power to create federal common law); Sanson v. General
Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 618, 622 (11 th Cir. 1992) (noting that a court cannot
create a federal common law under ERISA on the sole authority of a congressio-
nal report). But see Chemung Canal Trust Co. v. Sovran Bank, 939 F.2d 12, 17-
18 (2d Cir. 1991) (recognizing the courts' ability to develop "federal common
law" under ERISA if the claim is against a "fiduciary" and involves traditional
trust laws); Petrili v. Gow, 957 F. Supp. 366 (D. Conn. 1997) (same).
192 See supra notes 169-170, 187 and accompanying text (discussing that
Congress has the sole power to alter or amend statutory schemes when such
statutes are clear and have acquired a general understanding as to their intent,
structure, and legislative history).
'9' See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text (noting the defects in the
health care system created by ERISA).
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powers, which inhere important policy concerns that preserve
efficiency and fairness and maintain the credibility of the federal
courts as a competent, independent body.
2. The Inherent Problems with Vicarious Liability
Certain commentators have proposed adopting a system to
reform ERISA, irrespective of whether it is legislatively or
judicially created, which will allow recovery for vicarious or
derivative claims.194 This approach is inferior to the enactment of
the Bill because imposing vicarious liability without allowing direct
liability can produce anomalous results. For example, under
ERISA's preemption analysis, the actor directly liable and culpable
for causing an injury is immune from punishment, while the party
vicariously or indirectly liable is sanctioned instead of the primary
tortfeasor. 19
5
Moreover, indirect or vicarious claims are inherently inefficient
and unfair because they often require the claimant to fashion a
'94 See Easley, supra note 24, at 309-14 (advocating a system allowing for
vicarious liability, irrespective of whether judicially of legislatively created);
Grosso, supra note 44, at 450-51.
195 See Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F. Supp. 316, 317-18 (D.N.J. 1993)
(asserting that allowing vicarious liability claims while denying direct negligence
claims through preemption will lead to anomalous results, because an MCQ's
liability decreases the more directly involved it was in the harm caused to a.
patient). As the MCO' s conduct becomes more direct, and arguably more severe,
the less liability it will face in light of the fact that such MCO is immune from
liability for its direct conduct and merely responsible for its indirect actions. See
id. Any MCO decision centered on the negligent denial or delay of coverage,
however, under current ERISA preemption analysis, would not attach liability for
state claims or compensatory damages because MCOs are immune from state
based suits which are "relate[d] to" the provision and administration of benefits.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). In addition, such benefit decisions are theoretically made
pursuant to the parties' contractual relationship and capability of suit under
ERISA's enforcement provisions. Id. § 1132(a). Therefore, the only remedies, if
any, available are those expressly provided by ERISA, which merely allow
recovery of the value or cost of the wrongfully denied benefit. See id.
§ 1 132(a)(1)(B). This unfortunate effect may only be cured by federal legislation
expressly exposing MCOs to liability for tort damages and requiring MCOs to
redress the injuries that result from their negligent decision-making.
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weak, and possibly fictitious, direct claim against the provider in
an effort to hold the culpable party liable. 9 6 Indirect claims
needlessly create litigation against the provider and, as found by
the United States District Court of New Jersey in Ricci v.
Gooberman, provide an incentive for the consumer-claimant to
disingenuously aver that the MCO's conduct is merely indirect,
when that conduct is actually the direct cause of the injury because
the MCO is the negligent decision-maker. 197
In practice, vicarious liability claims are often purposefully
shaped and asserted merely to avoid ERISA preemption and to hold
MCOs liable for their direct, negligent conduct.198 For example,
the claimant may characterize the MCO's cost containment
policies, which allegedly provide strong incentives for physicians
to negligently deny patients care, as the root of an indirect claim
of negligence against the MCO that is attached to the main or
direct state law malpractice claim against a physician.' 99 Both the
indirect and direct claims escape preemption under ERISA because
they are not based on the administration of benefits by the
MCO,2°° but are rather rooted in the negligent policies of the
MCO which allegedly encourage physicians to engage in
196 See, e.g., Pacificare of Okla., Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 154 (10th Cir.
1995) (noting that vicarious liability claims against MCOs for the malpractice of
their physicians are attached to direct claims against providers, but these claims
may' also be determined independently of ERISA and without reference to the
benefit plan).
197 Ricci, 840 F. Supp. at 317-18. See also supra note 116-118 (discussing
that consumer harm in the health care market often results from the negligent
decision-making of MCOs).
19 See Ricci, 840 F. Supp. at 317-18.
199 See Walsh, supra note 50, at 232-33 (asserting that if financial incentives
are a motivating factor in denying a patient's treatment and patient is injured, the
physician can be held directly liable and the MCO can be held vicariously
liable). See also Easley, supra note 24, at 309 (noting that courts have held that
consumers injured by negligent treatment decisions controlled, arranged for, or
provided by health plans should be permitted to pursue state remedies for
negligence against an MCO).
200 See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 662-63, 668 (1995) (narrowing the scope of
ERISA's broad preemption to state claims affecting the structure, administration,
and type of benefits provided by a plan).
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malpractice, a state law claim independent of ERISA.2 °1 In
contrast, if such an indirect claim against the MCO was asserted
directly, it would be preempted as "relat[ing] to" ERISA and the
administration of benefits.20 2 Federal legislation, however, would
completely eliminate the need for that wasteful fiction because it
would allow for direct recovery under state law for injuries
sustained as a result of the negligence of an MCO.20 3 Therefore,
the Bill is a superior method to ensure that the culpable conduct of
MCOs is redressed because it expressly amends the preemption
clause and recognizes state law tort claims. 2° The Bill eliminates
the need to attach an indirect claim against an MCO to a question-
able direct claim against the provider, which could be, if meritori-
ous, redressed by itself in a distinct state law action.
3. The Impracticality of Focusing Legislative Reform
Solely on Federalism
Finally, some commentators advocate the adoption of federal
legislation to cure the problems flowing from ERISA preemption.
However, none of these commentators propose an effective
legislative scheme.05 In fact, one such commentator almost
201' Because doctors are independent contractors, separate from the health
plan subject to ERISA regulation, a state law claim of physician malpractice
coupled with an indirect claim against an MCO are immune from preemption
because these claims do not affect the administration of benefits, but supposedly
attack the competence of the service provided by the physician. See Walsh, supra
note 50, at 232-33.
202 ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
203 See H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. § 302(a) (1998).
204 id.
205 See Farrell, supra note 97, at 252-54 (asserting that a legislative scheme
reforming ERISA should ensure shared federal and state enforcement authority,
without providing practical provisions for allocating authority, and balancing
federalism policy concerns too delicately, making relief impractical); Jose L.
Gonzalez, A Managed Care Organization's Medical Malpractice Liability for
Denial of Care: The Lost World, 35 Hous. L. REv. 715, 790-99 (concluding that
Congress should enact legislation amending ERISA without any discussion of an
appropriate scheme or rationale); Shuren, supra note 140, at 776-82 (arguing that
Congress should create a duty of care requirement for MCOs and allow a direct
cause of action against MCOs under federal statutory provisions; however,
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exclusively focuses on federalism concerns, and attempts to balance
powers and responsibilities for health care between Congress and
the states.20 6 Indeed, this commentator appears to take a pragmat-
ic approach to achieve the ultimate goal of managed federal-
ism,2 0 7 but merely focuses on the ideal of federalism without any
analysis of the practical implications.0 8
Arguably, while creating a system of health care delivery which
epitomizes federalism may ensure that the state and national
governments only exercise the appropriate amount of authority,
there is no indication whether this system, in perfectly adhering to
federalism concerns, will function practically. 20 9 Moreover, the
Bill, as opposed to managed federalism, is a superior method of
reforming ERISA because it establishes uniform, practical federal
protections which clearly places the enforcement power in the
states, where consumers must file actions under state law to redress
injuries incurred through the negligence of their MCOs.2 10 In
effect, the Bill provides practical, real relief to consumers who
have been denied redress by the ERISA preemption regime, while
addressing federalism concerns by narrowly tailoring liability211
and encouraging states to participate in health care reform by
drafting remedial programs through which consumers of employer
provided health care can seek relief of violations of their federal
rights.212
ignoring federalism and judicial economy concerns).
206 See Farrell, supra note 97, at 288-89.
207 See Farrell, supra note 97, at 289 (defining "managed federalism" as a
system that "coordinates state and federal legislative and judicial and private and
public authorities based on their institutional competence to carry out necessary
functions").
208 See Farrell, supra note 97, at 288-99 (advancing a pragmatic approach
to health care reform by balancing the policymaking strength of Congress with
the administrative and enforcement strengths of the states, yet concluding that by
simply constructing a system of "managed federalism" lawmakers will create an
efficient and legitimate system of managed health care).
209 See Farrell, supra note 97, at 289.
210 See H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. § 302(a) (1998).
211 See supra notes 25-38, 108 and accompanying text (discussing that the
Bill narrowly tailors the liability of MCOs).
212 See supra note 153 and accompanying text (discussing that states create
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B. Misguided Cries of Economic Troubles
Unfortunately, the issue of health care reform seems to evoke
strong, emotional-laden positions from several commentators. The
positions of these commentators include: those who want reform
through legislation;2 3 those who want reform through the judicial
system;214 and others who want anything but reform and contend
that the market will adjust and correct any temporary prob-
lems.2 5 But like most debates, the dialogue seems to merely
reduce the topic of health care reform to a question of money: who
has it, who wants it, and how much will the desired good truly
cost? This debate often becomes bifurcated. For example, on one
side of the spectrum commentators' arguments implicitly assume
that quality of care is the ultimate goal of the health care sys-
tem.21 6 By contrast, the other side implicitly presumes that the
the substantive law through which consumers can redress their injuries, while the
federal govemment provides the protections, rights, and procedural mechanism
through which consumers may recover under those state remedial laws).
213 See supra note 205 (discussing commentator's positions).
214 See Caldwell, supra note 166, at 1315-19, 1350 (asserting that the
Supreme Court in Travelers adequately narrowed the application of ERISA
preemption, so as to allow courts to provide consumers ad hoc relief which
implicitly rejects the need for legislation); Grosso, supra note 44, at 450-51
(advocating recognition of enterprise liability or allowing consumers to assert
claims of vicarious and direct negligence, whether judicially or legislatively
created, and asserting that federal courts can and should narrow preemption
analysis and fashion ad hoc remedies for consumers).
215 See David A. Hyman, Consumer Protection in a Managed Care World:
Should Consumers Call 911?, 43 VILL. L. REv. 409, 412-13, 459-65 (1998)
(contending that legislative reform would only exacerbate the problems with
managed care, which the market can correct).
216 See Caldwell, supra note 166, at 1315-19, 1350 (asserting that the
Supreme Court in Travelers adequately narrowed the application of ERISA
preemption, so as to allow courts to provide consumers ad hoc relief which
implicitly suggests judicial review is necessary to improve the quality of health
care delivered to consumers); Farrell, supra note 97, at 252-54; Gonzalez, supra
note 205, at 790-99; Grosso, supra note 44, at 450-51 (advocating recognition
of enterprise liability or allowing consumers to assert claims of vicarious and
direct negligence whether judicially or legislatively created, to improve the
quality of health care delivery); Shuren, supra note 140, at 776-82 (arguing that
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cost of health care is the most relevant variable to any discussion
on the necessity for health care reform.2 7 Both views, of course,
do not address the key issues in the debate, and neither of the
presumptions will bring us closer to achieving a system that
provides the efficient delivery of reasonable health care while
allowing redress for culpable conduct causing injury.21 8 Advo-
cates of the Bill, however, have devised a superior method of
health care reform through federal legislation that not only
addresses quality of care concerns, 219 but also narrowly constructs
liability so as to ensure that the costs of providing health care do
not dramatically increase.22°
Those who oppose any form of health care reform, however,
contend that consumer protection legislation in the area of managed
care will inordinately increase costs by setting a floor on the
permissible level of coverage or will decrease the quality of care
through trade-offs and potential rent-seeking.221 In fact, one critic
ironically 222 asserts that by refraining from instituting any method
Congress should create a duty of care requirement for MCOs and allow a direct
cause of action against MCOs to improve the quality of the health care system).
217 See Hyman, supra note 215, at 447 (asserting that economic issues are
complex and determinative, in the sense that consumers-who include employers
who choose the plans for their employees-will and should choose coverage
based on costs rather than breadth of coverage, and as a result should be content
with their cost-price choice).
218 See supra notes 10 and 36 (discussing that remedies are traditionally
available through state common law actions to redress injuries caused by
culpable conduct within the marketplace).
219 See supra text accompanying notes 110-113 (summarizing the substance
of the Bill's consumer protection provisions).
220 See supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing the narrow
construction of the Bill, which minimally increases liability).
221 See, e.g., Hyman, supra note 215, at 412-13, 424-29 (asserting that such
a reform of the health care market would increase health care costs without
providing any benefit to consumers, because it encourages rent seeking by health
care providers who want a system of health care delivery, hidden behind a
concern for consumer protection, where the provision of services is not
questioned).
222 This contention is ironic because maintaining the status quo in the health
care market does not leave the health care system free from regulation. See
ERISA § 514 (a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994); ERISA § 502, § 1132(a) (1994)
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of reform, the health care market will self-adjust to cure isolated
problems while consumer legislation will not only exacerbate the
health care system's more complex problems.223
The approach of leaving the future of the health care system to
the market has little merit for several reasons. First, it is not
feasible because the current defects in the health care market stem
directly from previously enacted legislative reform-ERISA.224
Even if Congress does nothing, the market cannot correct the
systemic problems because one of the primary participants, the
MCO, is not subject to the same market pressures as the rest of the
industry. Under ERISA, the MCO is free from liability for all the
marketplace injuries that are caused as a result of its negligent
conduct.225 There is no rational explanation or justification for
MCOs to continue to be free from liability for their negligent
decision-making. Even a corporation with substantially less interest
(ERISA's preemption clauses regulate the health care market by allowing health
plans subject to its provisions to be free from liability under most state laws). In
fact, it merely preserves a severely regulated market where MCOs are free from
market pressures that constrain most businesses and require them to earn their
profits efficiently by staying sensitive to consumer needs or preferences, rather
than denying or delaying coverage to reduce costs. See supra note 155
(discussing the effects of ERISA on the health care market).
223 See Hyman, supra note 215, at 412-13.
224 See Hyman, supra note 215, at 436 & n.96 (asserting that ERISA plans
are beyond the scope of the author's discussion of the effects of "regulation" on
the marketplace because most state regulations are preempted and not applicable
to such ERISA plans). This assertion, however, is unpersuasive and avoids
dealing with a more complex issue-what effect ERISA plans, which represent
a large portion of the market-share, have on the health care marketplace as a
whole. This is merely a means of framing the regulation debate as a traditional,
linear issue of a cost versus quality tradeoff and allowing the author, who takes
the anti-regulation position, to characterize the pro-regulation approach as the
traditional pursuit of quality of care where price is no object. See Hyman, supra
note 215 at 460. In essence, this commentator employs the same method of
reasoning, a standard explanation lacking sufficient justification, to reject
regulation of the health care market that he expressly criticized when utilized by
pro-regulators. See Hyman, supra note 215, at 460. This reasoning does not
explain why ERISA plans are not included in debating the merits of regulating
MCOs.
225 See supra note 73 and accompanying text (asserting that ERISA
preemption effectively eliminated all remedies).
AMENDING ERISA 'S FAILURES
in doing business in a state is on notice that if it makes sufficient
"contacts" with that state or its citizens, it will be subject to
liability for any torts committed within that state or upon its
226citizens.
Second, the costs of providing consumer protections are
minimal, especially when compared to the benefits of such
legislative reform.227 For example, the cost of affording an
independent appeal process is estimated to be merely seven cents
a month, which is clearly a cost-effective method for providing
consumers with an opportunity to obtain relief and for restoring the
consumers' trust in the marketplace.22 s In addition, consumers
would be secure in the knowledge that such relief was available if
an emergency situation arose.229 Furthermore, "[t]here are a
number of studies that show that both external review and
expanding remedies would result in only a minimal increase in
costs. 2 30
Finally, under the current private-sector employer-provided
health care market, consumers and providers bear all the risks and
costs associated with any erroneous or wrongful decision made by
an MCO to delay or deny a consumer's pre-purchased health care
coverage under an ERISA plan. There are more efficient and
equitable methods of spreading the risk of loss in the marketplace
than placing such risks solely on the consumers and physicians. For
example, spreading the risk of loss among the three major participants-
226 See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319-20
(1945).
227 See supra notes 108, 122-132 and accompanying text (discussing the
narrow construction of the bill).
228 See Hearing on Grievance Procedures, supra note 37 (statement of Sen.
Kennedy) (providing an estimate by the Congressional Budget Office that the
cost of an independent appeal was seven cents a month).
229 See, e.g., H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. §101 (1998) (mandating that MCOs
provide access to emergency medical care irrespective of the available provider
and additional cost).
230 See Hearing on Grievance Procedures, supra note 37 (statement of Olena
Berg, Asst. Secretary of the Dep't of Labor's Pension and Welfare Benefits
Admin.) (explaining that even commentators critical of legislative reform
estimate that expanded remedies in general would increase employer premium
costs by only three-tenths of one percent).
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in the health care market would eliminate any incentive for the
risk-free market participant to assume risk with impunity. Discour-
aging moral hazard or unjustified risk-taking not only promotes
efficiency because it eliminates added or needless risk, but also
restores fairness and equity to the marketplace because the risk of
loss due to wrongful or erroneous decision-making of the once
immune party is spread among all the interested parties within a
transaction.
CONCLUSION
The Patients' Bill of Rights Act or legislation incorporating
similar key provisions, if enacted, will ensure that all American
consumers of health care services will have protection against their
managed care organization's failure to properly administer health
care. The Bill would protect against an MCO's failure to adequate-
ly inform the consumer of benefits and limitations of certain health
plan options; failure to offer point-of-service coverage-where the
consumer may purchase the option to use non-participating health
care providers; failure to provide access to emergency services
irrespective of whether the provider is a participating or nonpartici-
pating server; and failure to provide a timely appeal process to
address any delay or denial in health care coverage. This legislation
will not impose a new, unmanageable federal tort system, but
rather will inspire state legislators and courts to recognize these
basic consumer protections and afford remedies under current state
law tort principles for a managed care organization's negligent
conduct in the delivery or administration of health care services
resulting in personal injury or wrongful death. In the end, constitu-
tional principles of stare decisis, separation of powers, federalism,
and judicial economy will be satisfied-while improving and
fostering a more efficient health care system.
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